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ABSTRACT
The stage setting for the thesis is the intimate connection 
between the problem of reference and that of intensionality. The 
thesis is a survey of attempts to arrive at an account of truth and 
meaning for languages containing empty singular terms.
We begin with a general account of intensional predicates.
We give reasons to doubt that intensional verbs can take direct objects, 
and adopt Quine's strategy for intensional predicates like "seek", 
"worship", "refer". We discover certain complexities in verbs like 
"love", "hate".
When we examine the standard formal semantics we discover that 
to accommodate empty reference, we have to modify that approach. There 
are several ways to take in empty names. They fall broadly into two 
categories: theories without truth value gaps and theories with them. 
None of the theories which we examine is without difficulty. To 
dispose of empty reference would mean losing an important part of 
our discourse about the universe. We attempt to give an account based 
on the Kripkean theory of truth. This allows truth value gaps but 
retains the equivalence T^ p'^  = p. Our proposal is not successful.
This leaves no choice but to return to the standard formal semantical 
framework without gaps and to a theory of Tyler Burge. This is 
unfortunately incomplete. It may not be completable, Many semantically 
significant occurrences of empty names can be got into opaque contexts. 
For these we give an account which is inspired by Frege's account of 
"als ob" in "AusfUiirungen über Sinn und Bedeutung" in the Nachrelassene. 
Schriften and by Davidson's analysis of oratio obliqua.
Ill
Existential statements we put on one side as a special 
problem. Residual occurrences of empty names in transparent contexts 
are explained metalinguistically.
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INTRODUCTION
Philosophers have worried about the nature of objects of desire. 
Intensional predicates such as "search", "want", "worship", pose 
prima-facie a problem. They disturb our natural expectation that a 
sentence which has the grammatical form of subject, relation and object 
is true if and only if the entity named by the subject term stands in a 
certain relation to the entity named by the object term. This expectation 
is there before we embark on any theory of reference or theory of truth. 
And we are guided by this expectation in our formulation of a theory of 
reference and a theory of truth. The demand that this expectation be 
met gives an intuitive support for an extensional system - a system in 
which the truths of sentences are explained in terras of the extensions 
of components. Given that the extensional system is the natural system, 
what we seem to need to do with intensional sentences is to find a 
rationale for treating them as involving some non-standard functioning 
of predicates, terms, etc. This is of course to follow the general 
direction of Frege's "On Sense and Reference".
Intensional predicates have an important role: many of our
activities have an intensional character, and in order to understand a 
language which describes such activities in terms of intensional 
predicates, we need to understand the logical form of such sentences 
as "x seeks y", "x worships y", "x wants y" etc. We require from an 
adequate overall account of the workings of language that the account 
describe and explain the semantical workings of intensional predicates 
and of their real or apparent objects.
The importance of empty reference can be explained in the 
following way, V/e use and have to use vacuous names whether knov/n 
or unknown to us, which have no reference and predicates which 
nothing satisfies. But if all this is so then a semantical theory
must recognize the need to interpret empty names and predicates and to
evaluate the sentences containing them. - Even if we were ourselves 
omniscient v/e should still need to describe the beliefs of those less 
fortunate.
We cannot readily conceive of a state of affairs in which our 
knowledge protects us from uttering sentences which (on one theory at
least) have no truth value or in which we no longer need to frame
scientific hypothesis relating to suppositional entities which may turn 
out not to exist. The sort of ignorance just described may issue in 
outright mistake. There also appears to.be the case where knov/ing 
that we are ignorant we wish to make a hypothetical ascription to a 
thing, say Vulcan, conditionally upon its existing. We may hope that 
any semantical theory v/hich is adequate to the first sort of situation 
may be adequate to the second as well, Beth of these are utterly 
different from fiction; but again a theory' which solves the two 
problems already mentioned may yield as a byproduct a solution to the 
traditional problem of fictional names,
V/hat seems to be clear about sentences containing empty names 
such as "Vulcan" is that they are not meaningless. Scientists once 
believed such sentences, eg, "Vulcan disturbs the perihelion of Mercury" 
and we can understand their belief. They may have been wrong but it was 
not in the ordinary sense nonsense that they believed. It appears at 
first sight to follow that there snoula oe no proolem about stating 
the meaning of such sentences.
If we take Frege's explanation, then the sense of a sentence 
is the thought that those conditions are satisfied which must be satisfied 
for the sentences to be true. If sentences with empty names say some­
thing, then it seems we must be able to state what would have to be the 
case for them to be true. To identify the sense of a sentence with its 
truth conditions is in effect to accept Davidson's programme that giving 
the theory of meaning for a language is giving the theory of truth for 
that language. Since we can state the truth conditions of sentences 
independently of their truth values, it appears at first sight that we 
should be able to give a theory of truth which will embrace any scientific 
theory regardless of whether it is true or false and, one is tempted to 
add, regardless even of its being, as things actually are, neither true 
nor false - provided only that it says something. It appears then that 
the theory of truth cannot be limited to actual objects. Whether a 
scientific theory such as the theory about Vulcan is true looks as if 
it ought to be a matter of empirical investigation. The matter of its 
semantics ought, it seems,to be independent of that. If we can 
investigate the truth of such a theory then there must already be 
something it means. Or so it seems.
The thesis is an attempt to arrive at an account of meaning and 
truth for a natural language containing serious non-denoting names. It 
takes seriously and exploits the intensionality of the notion of reference 
by extending to "refer" a treatment which Quine originally introduced 
for such predicates as "seek". The thesis attempts to show that there 
is an intimate connection between the problem of intensionality and 
that of reference.
The problems of empty singular terms and of intensionality are 
connected in this way: in intensional contexts empty singular terms
4clearly have some semantic role. Using empty terms in intensional and 
apparently intensional contexts we can make true assertions. Regarding 
sentences such as "The Greeks worshipped Zeus" there is a general ag­
reement about their truth values. But as for sentences containing 
empty terms in extensional contexts, e.g. "Vulcan is a planet", our 
intuitions are not very clear.
The thesis can be divided into three parts. In the first place 
we shall begin with some general considerations about intensional 
predicates and their objects. The criteria of extensionality are given 
as the usual principles of intersubstitivity and the law of existential 
generalization. We try to show that intensional sentences do not (in 
a phrase of Davidson) wear the logical form on their sleeves: the
grammatical objects are not the logical objects. Intensional predicates 
do not take direct objects but take prepositional objects.• We illustrate 
the problem with some examples. We discuss three unsatisfactory 
answers to what "El Dorado" refers to in "Aguirre sought El Dorado".
(1) "El Dorado" refers to El Dorado. (2) "El Dorado" refers to the 
.concept of El Dorado, (3) "El Dorado" refers to a possible object.
We expound Quine's strategy for intensional predicates and apply 
it to the problematic sentences. Several objections to Quine's strategy 
can be answered reasonably well.
Then we apply Quine's strategy to some other predicates: 
"worship" and "love" to fortify our confidence before applying it to 
the main project.
We next attempt to give an account of an intensional notion of 
reference, following the Quinean pattern in part I. There are at leasb
two different notions of reference: speech-act reference and semantic
reference. We adopt Quine’s proposal for both notions of reference. 
"Refer" is seen as an intensional predicate to be paraphrased as 
"purport to mention", where "mention" is purely extensional.
We conclude that postulating an intensional notion of reference 
does not lead directly to any evaluation procedure for sentences 
containing empty names in extensional contexts.
We then discuss various proposals for evaluating sentences 
containing empty names in extensional positions. The orthodox approach 
of Tarski - Davidson does not accommodate such sentences.
We examine in detail the view that such sentences do express 
genuine thought. It might appear that such sentences lack a definite 
truth value since the orthodox approach has not given us their truth 
conditions. Dummett has pointed out that admitting truth value gaps 
conflicts with the schema True""p^  = p. We can divide the non-orthodox 
proposals according to how this conflict is resulved. There are four 
possibilities: (0) Reject both truth value gaps and T^p" = p;
(1) Reject truth value gaps and retain T ~p“* = p; (2) Reject T^pi e P 
and retain truth value gaps; (3) Retain both gaps and T Cp"^ e P«
(There is a hybrid between (1) and (3): Smiley’s system in "Sense
without denotation". This rejects both T V  e P and truth value gaps 
for the metalanguage and retains truth value gaps for the object 
language. This view shall be examined in an appendix.
The possibility (0) requires no discussion since no such actual 
theory has been put forward.
In (1) there are three distinct accounts: (A) Frege's system
in the'Grundgesetze which requires A as the reference of all empty
singular terms; (B) Scott's system in "Existence and Description in 
formal logic" which is a modification of Frege's system; (C) Grandy's 
system in "A definition of truth for theories with intensional definite 
description operators" which is a modification of Scott's system.
The possibility (2) is van Fraassen's supervaluations. V/e shall 
examine this account in the light of the possibility (3) which is 
Kripke's new theory of truth, which proposes to retain both T^p“* = p 
and truth value gaps.
We attempt to give a theory of truth for a language containing 
partial predicates and empty singular terms in the spirit of Kripke's 
proposal. This proposal proves to have a fatal flaw. V/e return once 
more to the only remaining theory without gaps, viz. Tyler Burge's 
theory. There are fundamental objections against Burge's account.
After that the time has come to assemble the general difficulties 
of empty reference, and to collect up the requirements we have arrived- 
at in the course of the argument. We account for the failure of various 
theories to satisfy the requirements. We conclude v/ith a reassessment 
of the standard semantics and propose a way of accommodating empty 
reference based on Frege's account of "als ob" and on Davidson’s 
analysis of indirect discourse. This final proposal leaves unresolved 
some problems about empty names.
CHAPTER I
INTENSIONAL PREDICATES AND THEIR OBJECTS
Are there intensional predicates which take direct objects, 
i.e. are there any intensional predicates that stand for relations 
which hold between the objects which are designated by their terms?
The usually accepted criteria of extensionality for predicates 
are the principle of intersubstitutivity and the law of existential 
generalization:
(A) (x)(y)(x=y & Ex-^Fy).
(B) Fa h (3 x) Fx.
Predicates that fail to meet these criteria are commonly said 
to be intensional. So far as grammar is concerned, we can divide 
predicates which fail (A) and (B) into those which take individual 
direct objects of the normal kind, and those which do not. Examples 
of the first kind are:
Aguirre sought El Dorado.
The Greeks worshipped Zeus.
Examples of the second kind are:
Leverrier conjectured that Vulcan disturbs the
perihelion of Mercury.
Galileo said that the Earth moves.
We shall be concerned here with the first sort, the sort which 
appears to take direct objects.
8The question whether there are intensional predicates which 
take direct objects can also be put this way: are the grammatical
objects of these predicates also logically speaking their objects?
We shall take up some examples to illustrate the hypothesis that there 
are no intensional predicates which take direct objects. Then we shall 
give a general argument to support this z^iew.
Take "seek" in
(1) Aguirre sought El Dorado,
"Seek" fails to meet both of the criteria of extensionality.
Given El Dorado = the city paved in gold, we might say that Aguirre
(1 )sought the city paved with gold . Perhaps this is all right - after 
all, a city paved in gold would have served very well for a man with 
Aguirre’s particular purpose. But this does not guarantee intersubstit­
ution generally. Given, suppose, that El Dorado = the land of cannibals, 
then we cannot say that Aguirre sought the land of cannibals. Again, if 
an explorer seeks a certain place x and x is the place of his death, 
it may be wrong to say that he sought the place of his death. Existential 
generalization is problematic also because from "Aguirre sought El 
Dorado" we cannot conclude that there exists something which Aguirre 
sought.
How then is "El Dorado" to be interpreted in "Aguirre sought 
El Dorado"? There are at least three different answers that regard 
"seek" as having a direct object: (1) "El Dorado" refers to El Dorado.
(2) "El Dorado" refers to the concept of El Dorado, (3) "El Dorado" 
refers to the possible object El Dorado.
View (1) seems unsatisfactory because El Dorado does not exist.
It does not follow from Aguirre’s search that there was something he
sought* But (prima facie, at least) this would follow from the proposed 
analysis, as apparently would the intersubstitutability of identicals. 
Even the motivation for view (1) will disappear, however, if we follow 
Frege in refusing to be misled by grammar in giving a logical analysis. 
The grammatical object of the predicate "seek" is "El Dorado". El 
Dorado need be no more than the grammatical object, however.
View (2) is suggested by Frege’s doctrine of indirect sense and 
reference In oblique contexts words refer to what is normally their
sense.
Church’s amendment^^^ of Frege’s doctrine seems just as hard to 
understand as Frege’s doctrine. Church states that, according to a ■ 
Fregean analysis, "Schliemann sought the site of Troy" expresses a 
relation between Schliemann and "the concept of the site of Troy".
First, I should object that using the term "concept" which has a clear 
technical meaning in Frege’s philosophy to explain the distinct Fregean 
notion of sense only adds confusion to obscurity. Second, in spite of 
Church’s remark that his interpretation of Frege does not imply that 
Schliemann sought the concept of the site of Troy, it has not been made 
plain in this passage of Church's book how else we should understand 
the account Church offers. For this does suggest that "Schliemann 
sought the site of Troy" expresses a relation between Schliemann and 
the concept of the site of Troy. If the relation in question, seeking, 
is a genuine relation, it ought to relate its terms, which are here the 
seeker, Schliemann, and what is sought, the concept site of Troy* 
According to Church’s account (in the sample sentence), seeking is a 
relation between Schliemann and the concept: what can this mean except
that Schliemann and the concept stand in the relation of seeking as the 
seeker and what is sought?
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There are further objections of Carnap^^^ and Davidson^^^ to 
the effect that the difficulty of explaining what indirect sense and 
reference are become more acute when we consider multiply intensional 
or oblique contexts. We shall not elaborate on these objections, for 
even if they could be met, what the obscurity or feilure of Church’s 
account indicates is that even for simply oblique contexts, Frege's 
doctrine will resist a coherent formulation if we admit intensional 
predicates with direct objects.
There is an important insight in Frege's doctrine to be rescued 
all the same. In oblique contexts the references of words have to be 
seen as not contributing in the usual way to the truth conditions of 
the main sentence. If we keep this insight, and leave on one side 
Church's particular appreciation of it, then we are to that extent less 
tempted to posit possibilie or other entities as references of terms in 
referentially opaque contexts.
View (3) can be presented as follows. If
(1) Aguirre sought El Dorado 
is a fact, then
(1)' Aguirre sought something
must also be a fact. What Aguirre sought cannot be an actual object 
given that El Dorado does not exist. The only candidate for Aguirre's 
object of search is the possible object9 El Dorado. The advantage of 
seeing El Dorado as a possible object over View (1) might be said to be 
that we can distinguish (I)’ from
(1)’’ There is something Aguirre sought 
which is false.
The distinction between (1)' and fï)'' seems important.
Perhaps an adequate account of ’’seek’’ should preserve this distinction 
and explain it.
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That admitting possible objects to be objects of intensional 
predicates does not give us a satisfactory account of "search" however, 
becomes clear when we try to state the truth-conditions for (1) in terms 
of search for a possible object. We would have:
(l) is true if Aquirre sought the possible object 
El Dorado.
First, it seems false to describe Aguirre as searching for a 
possible object. How does one look for a possible object, as opposed 
to an actual object? Second, if it makes sense to describe Aguirre as 
looking for a possible object El Dorado, we should be able to distinguish 
Aguirre's search for El Dorado from Columbus's search for India, which 
would be a search for an actual object, and from Phenias's search for 
the round square, which would be a search for an impossible object. We 
should then have to give different accounts for what seems to be the 
same phenomenon - subjectively at least. And it is to the subjectivity 
of the experience that we are trying to be sensitive. Aguirre thought 
that El Dorado was an actual object. Otherwise he would not have 
started out at all.
Some remarks about the general strategy of possible world 
semantics for propositional attitudes are called for. We shall 
mention Hintikka's approach briefly for it might seem to be an 
alternative to the approach we adopt. Hintikka holds, in general, 
that the presence of a propositional attitude means that possible 
worlds other than the actual one have to be considered^^^. Hintikka 
proposes to analyse "believe" as follows:
a believes that p = in all possible worlds 
compatible with what a believes it is the 
case that p.
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There are some difficulties with this proposal before we even 
look for extensions to such verbs as "search". Does it make sense to 
talk as there would be a reckoning of the totality of what a believes? 
What about the logical consequences of such beliefs? Even if these 
issues could be settled, there is a simple objection which a possible 
world semantics approach cannot answer: when the beliefs are intended
as beliefs about the actual world, it cannot be correct to analyse them 
as beliefs about a possible world.
Apart from Quine's well-known objections about the criteria of 
identification for possible objects, the value of applying the apparatus 
of possible worlds to our problem is something which their champions 
have still to demonstrate. They have yet to show their analyses are 
"life like". If we can explain the phenomenon of intensionality without 
the apparatus, so much the better.
Having seen how some attempts at introducing intensional 
predicates with direct objects are not successful, we can try to give 
a general argument to show why there are not such predicates.
It would seem that for there to be intensional predicates which 
take direct objects the two criteria of extensionality would sometimes 
have to come apart. For a predicate to be intensional, it has to fail 
at least one of the criteria. But for the predicate to have a (logical) 
direct object it seems that at least (B) existential generalization has 
to be true. If someone seeks a, then he seeks something - this is 
something some of our opponents have insisted upon; even if, if a = b, 
he does not necessarily seek b. This is how things looks before we 
attribute more structure to "seek" than grammatically appears.
There is no obvious difficulty yet. On the surface it might 
seem that the two criteria are independent of one another. It might
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be thought that the failure of (A) intersubstitutivity does not imply 
nor is implied by (B) existential generalization • For the failure 
of (a ) is not in itself a failure of existence of the objects referred 
to by singular terms. It is rather a question of the attitude - 
knowledge or belief or whatever - of the subject, the manner in which 
the object is identified depending on this attitude. The failure of 
(B) on the other hand is simply a failure of existence of the objects 
referred to.
What this argument extablishes is that reasons for the breakdown 
of (A) and Cb ) in referentially opaque contexts can be described 
apparently independently. But the unsurprising fact that the reasons 
for their failure can be stated separately - after all they are two 
different criteria - does not prove that we really do have straight 
forward cases where one is satisfied without the other.
We could argue for the inseparability of (A) and (B) as follows. 
Starting with (A), we understand it as saying that for all values of 
"x" and "y", if they are identical, whatever is true of one, is true of 
the other. (A) implies that if there are objects which are F ’s, then 
they are F's no matter how they are referred to, no matter what name is 
used. But surely we cannot have some object being F without some 
particular object being F. Thus the only conceivable interpretive 
apparatus for (A) and the application of (A) already seems to bring in 
principles which justify (B). Any instance of (A) involves definite 
objects. Suppose (a=b & Fa-^Fb), then surely a has to be a definite 
object. But "Fa" cannot be true unless there exists something which 
had to be F for it to be true that Fa. "Fa" could not be true if its 
truth grounds were indeterminate and its truth grounds could not be 
determinate if it was not determinate or determinable which thing 
a was. But how is that possible without a existing?
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Let us look at the matter the other way round. Starting with
(B), we can say that, if it is true that an object is F, then it 
certainly is true that there is something, namely this object, which 
is F. And if a is F, it is F no matter how it is referred to.
Now suppose that it were held that there was an object b such that
a = b and such that b was not F. Then the object which "a" and "b"
denoted would have to both have and lack the property F.
It is not that (A) entails (B ), or that (B) entails (A). In 
classical logic, of course, they do, but it is begging the question to 
argue from that. It is rather that it is hard to see how to interpret 
the symbolisms involved by either (A) or (B) without being forced to 
find both plausible.
It would take something more than this to prove that there cannot 
be any intensional predicates which take direct objects. At best, it 
has been suggested why the attempts to introduce them have not been 
successful. Given the plausibility and connexion of the two criteria 
of extensionality, it will not be easy to give a coherent account of 
such predicates.
15
CHAPTER II
QUINE'S STRATEGY FOR INTENSIONAL PREDICATES
At this point what we naturally look for is another way of seeing 
these phenomena of intensionality. An obvious candidate is Quine's 
strategy . This treats intensional predicates as having propositional 
objects. This amounts to assimilating the intensional predicates with 
direct object constructions to those with "...that..." constructions.
Quine analyses intensional predicates as having two different 
senses, "relational" and "notional", corresponding to the wide and the 
narrow scope of the existential quantifier. Taking one of Q.uine's. 
examples
(2) Ernest is hunting lions 
the relational reading is
(2)' (3x) (x is a lion & Ernest strives that
Ernest finds x) 
and the notional reading is
(2)'' Ernest strives that ( 3 x) (x is a lion &
Ernest finds x).
Quine states that the advantage of paraphrasing intensional 
predicates in the above manner to uncover propositional attitudes and 
extensional predicates is that we can express the contrast between
(2)' and (2)" and arrive at a general theory for intensional
(9)
predicates apparently governing direct accusatives • We can 
paraphrase other intensional predicates in terms of "strive that" or 
"wish that". Quine interprets (2)' as saving that Ernest is hunting 
a particular lion, "a stray circus property, for example", and (2)" 
as saying that Ernest is hunting just any lion. (2)" is taken to
16
be the correct rendering of (2). (2)' is seen as involving an
improper quantification into a propositional attitude idiom from 
outside* Quine claims that quantification into a referentially opaque 
context is a dubious business. Quine’s examples are meant to show 
that quantifying into an opaque context results in either nonsense or 
outright falsehood. Take "Giorgione was so-called because of his 
size". Existential generalization would lead to "(3x) Cx was so- 
called because of his size)" which is clearly meaning l e s s ^ .
Another example which is closer to our concern is 
Ctesias is hunting unicorns.
We cannot allow
(3 x) (x is a unicorn & Ctesias is hunting x) 
since unicorns do not exist. Apart from Quine’s reasons for disallow­
ing quantification into opaque contexts in general, just the fact that 
we seek, hunt, and want what is non-existent should be enough to make 
us suspicious of applying existential generalization from outside to 
singular terms inside propositional attitude contexts.
There are several objections to Quine’s strategy which we must 
meet before we can use it. And there is one which we should dispose of 
immediately.
It might be thought that the reading of (1) Aguirre sought El
Dorado, Quine would prefer
(1 )’' . Aguirre strove that (3 x) (x is El Dorado &
Aguirre finds x)
implies that Aguirre strove to bring about the existence or create
El Dorado. For it appears that (1)’’ can be unpacked into
(1 )"’ Aguirre strove that (3 x) (x is El Dorado &
(11)
(3x) (Aguirre finds x)
17
which might be,said to be equivalent to
(1)"" Aguirre strove that (3x) (x is El Dorado &
Aguirre strove that C 3x) (Aguirre finds x)•
The first conjunct of (1)"" appears to say that Aguirre strove to bring 
about the existence of El Dorado. There is one quick way with this 
objection. The objection depends on a principle of inference relating 
to opaque contexts which we should not accept. In opaque contexts 
substitution of logically equivalent formulas does not necessarily 
preserve truth. We can say that the move from (1)" to (1)"’ is not 
allowed because in an opaque context we cannot admit the replacement 
of (Hx)(Fx & Gx) by (3 x) Fx & (3 x) Gx.
Another, and related way with the objection is to forbid the 
move from (I)'" to (1)"". It might be said that striving to bring 
about p 8c q does not necessarily entail striving to bring about p 
separately.
We come now to the more serious objections. The second
objection is that Quinean paraphrase is too linguistic. The activity
of search, for instance, is analysed by Quine as an attitude towards
some statement, as striving to make true a certain sentence about the
seeker and the object which is sought. Quine allows that describing
a mouse’s fear of a cat as fearing true to certain English sentence is
(12)
unnatural but "without therefore being wrong" . But it might be
objected that it is wrong to describe Aguirre’s search for El Dorado
as his endeavour to make true some sentence. Searching for a city
paved in gold in South America is not reducible to endeavouring to
make true some sentence. It might even be said that the Quinean
reading is not far enough removed from Church’s account of Schliemann s
(13)
looking for the concept of the site of Troy . It may be said that
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we cannot press all intensional predicates into the mold of indirect 
speech, simply because searching for something is far too unlike saying 
something. This objection would also apply to the generalization of 
other intensional predicates of Davidson’s theory of oratio obliqua^. ' .
V/e can attempt to answer this objection by minimizing the 
linguistic factor. We can say that Guine's paraphrase does not reduce 
the activity of searching for El Dorado to an attitude to a sentence.
The point is that one cannot search for El Dorado without endeavouring
to bring about a certain state of affairs, a state of affairs which can 
be described with the English words ”I find El Dorado”o Eut it need not
be described with that sentence, though if we want to say what state of
affairs we shall have to say it somehow. Just as if we v/ant to call an 
animal by a species name we shall have to use some expression. This 
does not show that species are linguistic.
Quine's kind of paraphrase is justified then just to the extent 
that whenever we search for something we also strive to bring something 
about and that something is something which may be expressed by the 
subordinate clause of Quine’s analysis. Of course, this does not give 
the complete account of what the activity of searching, or trying to 
bring about that one finds something,amounts to, even if that were 
possible. That was not the claim we made for Quine's strategy: the
claim is that we get closer to the logical form of the sentence
C1) Aguirre sought El Dorado 
and that we can clarify its truth conditions without resolving every 
outstanding question about the analysis of all the other concepts 
involved.
The third objection is this: Quine's paraphrase applied to
Cl) produces a dilemma. Before any analysis of (1), it is clear that
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in seeking El Dorado Aguirre was not seeking just any old place®
So the reading of (1) which Quine would prefer
(1)" Aguirre strove that (H x) (x is El Dorado &
Aguirre finds x)
gives uSj it may he said, a false account of one natural understanding 
of (1)# We are left with the wide scope reading which says that Aguirre 
sought a particular place
C D ’ C 3 x) C X is El Dorado & Aguirre strove to
find x)
Cor, sidestepping the problem of quantifying in, we shall adopt Quine's 
suggestion and rephrase the wide scope reading as C3x) Cx is El 
Dorado & Aguirre strove to make true of x, z CAguirre finds z)).
But this is definitely wrong, since El Dorado does not exist.
Quine's own examples were about searching for a unicorn, or 
a lion. V/hen we apply Quine’s analysis to sentences containing singular 
terms, the distinction between the wide and the narrow scope should not 
be stressed as the distinction between an indefinite and a particular, 
but as the distinction between existential import and no existential 
import. Our reply to the objection is that we should indeed take both 
CD' and C1)” to be about a particular place. For the proper name 
"El Dorado" imports particularity - or rather for Aguirre it does.
We can keep, therefore, CD" as the correct rendering of CD.
The fourth objection follows up the third, however. It is that 
Quinean analysis fails to give us the correct reading of sentences
such as '
C4) Aguirre sought a city paved in gold.
C4) may well mean that Aguirre’s search was directed at "any old" 
city paved with gold. But it may also mean - and usually does mean - 
that Aguirre's search was either directed to or airected as if to
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(what he thought of as) a certain city paved with gold. In this 
instance, and for Aguirre, it was a particular — directed search, 
even if there was no such particular in fact. In that case the correct 
reading of (4) is that Aguirre sought a particular city. Quine shows 
no way to give this reading. The objector is quite right. Proceeding 
a la Quine, we have tv/o readings but neither of them captures the sense 
just explained.
(4)' (3 x) (x is a city paved in gold & Aguirre
strove to make true of x, z (Aguirre finds x))
(4)" Aguirre strove that (3 x) (x is a city paved
in gold & Aguirre finds x)
We have the same difficulty here that seemed to arise with
(1) Aguirre sought El Dorado.
(4)' requires there to be a city paved in gold; and (4)” only 
represents the search for "any old” city paved in gold.
We shall discuss two possible solutions to this dilemma.
Neither is without difficulty. First, we can refuse to take the 
desired reading of (4) very seriously, and dismiss the idea that there 
is such a reading as an illusion left by the name "El Dorado” which was 
essential to the explanation of the desired reading. But this is too 
defeatist and we then lose the means of expressing the distinction 
between searching for, wanting, and hunting a particular and searching 
for, wanting and hunting just any object® This is an important 
difference in the subjective experiences of people in these states - 
even when they are mistaken.
The second solution not only accepts that Quine’s analysis 
does not yield the desired reading of (4) but also looks for a reading 
of (4) which will report Aguire as searching for a particular city
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without the ubterer of (4) himself claiming that there exists any 
particular city which Aguirre sought. A first attempt at such a 
reading is
(4)"' Aguirre strove that (3 x) (x is the city paved in 
gold & Aguire finds x)®
It might, for a moment, appear that by this "the" (4)"’ captures the 
fact that Aguirre sought a particular city. (This may appear to hold 
regardless of what theory of descriptions we adopt.) However the 
difficulty with (4)"' is that the use of the definite description, 
"the city paved in gold" to paraphrase the original sentence which 
contained an indefinite description seems unjustified. (4)"’ is a 
paraphrase of
Aguirre sought the city paved in gold 
and not of (4) read in the way that gives trouble. Perhaps Aguirre 
thought there was more than one such city, but aimed at El Dorado, and 
it is his search for El Dorado, in particular, that makes it true that 
he sought some particular city. The relational reading of (4), viz. 
(4)’ said that Aguirre looked for a particular city. If we imbed 
(4)' in an intensional context to avoid the existential commitment 
(4)' implied, we have
(4)"" Aguirre behaved in accordance with the 
belief that
(or for Aguirre it was as if)
■ (3 x) (x is a city paved in gold & Aguirre 
strives to make true of x, z (Aguirre finds z))
(4)"II might seem slightly implausible as a paraphrase of the original 
sentence (4) which was much simpler. Normally philosophical para­
phrases about logical form should not be permitted to exercise so much
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poetic license* It is difficult to see an orderly generalizable set of 
transformations by which (4) comes to be the surface structure of (4)""* 
There is something ad hoc here® At the very end of the thesis, however, 
we shall see that there must always be something peculiar about contexts 
involving empty names. That explanation will help us here, when we look 
back from there to the present difficulty. It will if, as seems possible, 
the missing "particular" reading of (4) by which the objector has been 
struck depends on our prior understanding of such contexts as "Aguire 
sought (in particular) El Dorado", and on our being dale to see (4), 
read the objector’s way, as the generalization of that special sentence. 
(That it is a special sort, will only appear fully at the end.) For, for 
such contexts as (4), we normally get the particularity of seeking some 
particular city by exporting the quantifier. We are saying that perhaps 
the particularity we want for (4), understood in the troublesome way, 
is a kind of shadow of the particularity. We can normally get by 
exporting the quantifier - though we cannot actually do that here (on 
the normal reading of quantifiers). To allow that the desired reading 
of (4) is just possible is not necessarily to think that there is 
nothing special or irregular about what makes it possible. In the end 
we shall argue that empty names always require special treatment, and 
the reader can review then the question whether we have the right to 
use ad hoc means to explain by (4)"" the possibility of the objector’s 
reading of (4).
What is more worrying about (4)"" than its ad hoc property, 
is the problem of sufficiency. The charge of insufficiency might be 
that (4)"" does not capture the activity (4) describes, only the 
thought or belief. It might be said that the connection between 
Aguirre’s thought and action suggested by (4)"" is too tenuous for 
it to be a paraphrase of Agpirre’s activity: given the mere thought
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or belief we ascribe to Aguirre, he need not have embarked on his 
adventure. If the objection is right and there is no necessary 
connection between (4)"" and action, an amendment on this lines may 
be enough: Aguirre acted as if O  x) (Aguirre sought x) and in as
much as he acted so, it was for him as if ("3x) (x is a city paved 
in gold & Aguirre strives to make true of x, z (Aguirre finds z)).
We have already admitted that we have been forced here into 
the ad hoc, and promised a trial view of the whole subject which will 
help to justify the feeling that what we are struggling with is a 
special sort of case. '
The fifth objection is that it is not certain whether Quine's 
strategy can be applied to intensional predicates in general. If 
Quine's strategy is to be of any value, it must give us an overall 
account of intensional predicates. Even if Quine's paraphases about 
the particular example were plausible, Quine's proposal of extending 
his analysis to other intensional predicates cannot be accepted straight 
off without further explanation for the following reasons. First, we 
have to admit that it is not clear that all intensional contexts contain 
hidden prepositional attitudes and prepositional objects. For instance, 
what are the corresponding prepositional attitudes and prepositional 
objects in •
a knows b 
. a is acquainted with b
. Dante loved Beatrice
The Greeks worshipped Zeus 
Or are these less intensional than they look?
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I admit that we have not shov/n that there cannot be any 
intensional piedicates with irreducible direct objects. It may be said 
that to have shov/n that attempts at arriving at direct objects are 
defeated is only to have shown that the right account is not yet known. 
The only answer we can offer to this is to reply that Quine's strategy 
suggests how vie can achieve something on Quine's pattern among inten­
sional predicates generally, and without multiplying objects of desire, 
love and worship. Quine's pattern of analysis eliminates the need to 
posit extra ocjects. But this claim will only carry conviction if vie 
first treat a few more of the apparently intensional predicates such 
as "love", "worship", which appear to take direct objects. And this 
we shall attempt to do in the next section.
The sixth objection is this: Quine's paraphrase involves an
analysis of activities eg. hunting in terms of their aims, eg. finding. 
This is analogous to explaining games in terms of winning. Now, it is 
not clear that all activities are like games. When we cannot analyse 
an intensional predicate in terras striving or endeavouring towards a 
goal, the analysis will have to stray further from Quine's examples. 
Again the general issue can only be argued by reference to examples.
The quinean strategy was a reaction to the threat of inco­
herence. We have not proved that incoherence, only suggested it. But 
the suggestion the intensionalist has to answer is that if we cannot 
analyse an intensional predicate which apparently governs accusatives 
in terms of a propositional attitude and an extensional predicate (eg. 
in terms of an activity with an aim), then we cannot make much sense 
of that predicate®
CHAPTER III
INTERMEZZO : WORSHIP AND LOVE
A. WORSHIP
"Worship" is an obvious case to discuss, for it seems to be 
intensional. In true sentences, such as
(1) The Greeks worshipped Zeus
(2) The Egyptians worshipped Isis
"worship" fails both of the criteria of extensionality. Applying one of 
our variants on the Quinean strategy to (1) we have
(1)* The Greeks conducted themselves appropriately 
to the belief that O  x) (x is Zeus & we hold 
X in fear & reverence)
where "hold in fear & reverence" is extensional. What is at issue is 
that Quinean notional reading can be given for sentences such as (1) 
and (2).
Can we give Quinean notional reading for sentences about
"worship", in general? Consider Kripke's argument designed to show
(13)
that we mush give the relational reading for some sentences «
Kripke’s example was
(3) Christians worship a loving god
Kripke applied Quine's analysis of "want" to "worsnip" to show that 
something was wrong with Quinean analysis of "v/orshap". Kripke
explains that
(4) I want .a sloop
is given two readings by Quine:
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(4)' (3 x) (x is a sloop. I wish of x that I
have x)
(4)'' • I wish that (3x) (x is a sloop, I have x)
(4)' is taken as saying "There is a particular sloop I want" and (4)" 
as saying "I want any old sloop"; as Quine puts the matter, (4) merely 
expresses the desire for relief from "slooplessness". Kripke shows 
that if we apply this analysis to "worship" we run into a dilemma.
Take
(3) The Christians worship a loving god
It would be given two readings in the Quinean analysis^^^^
(3)’ (3 x) (x is a loving god & Christians conduct
themselves appropriately to the believing of x 
(z (we hold z in fear and reverence)))
(3)" Christians conduct themselves appropriately to 
the belief (3 x) (x is a loving god & we hold 
X in fear & reverence)
Now, according to Kripke, (3)’ is interpreted as "There is a particular 
loving god that the Christians worship". And (3)" is interpreted as 
"The Christians worship any old loving god", (3)’ is a report which 
no atheist would make. Yet an atheist needs to be able to report the 
Christians’ belief. So (3)" is the proper candidate for that. But it 
fails, according to Kripke, to convey the particularity of the 
Christians’ belief, Kripke concludes that since Quine's strategy has 
failed, the whole project of dismantling "worship" must be abandoned. 
The only alternative he thinks is to postulate the entities of worship.
If we are willing to admit worshipped entities into the 
ontology as Kripke appears to be, and give a wider range to the
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quantifiers, we can accept (3)’ as true. But Kripke's observations do 
not show that quantification over worshipped entities is required. For 
(3)" cannot be held to say that the Christians worship any old loving
(17)
god. The particularity Kripke. seeks is already implicit in the belief 
We conclude with a few remarks about this strategy.
As Scott has advised, we have to be clear from the outset about 
the domain of d i s c o u r s e ^ a n d  the range of quantifiers. We cannot in 
the midstream decide to admit new entities or enlarge the domain because 
some linguistic analysis seems to force it upon us. In the case of the 
range of quantifiers we are restricted by what there is. And that cannot 
be decided by a linguistic analysis. So it would seem less ad hoc to 
pursue Quine's sort of approach, as we have, than to postulate new 
entities.
B. LOVE
Is "love" intensional? We shall take two examples to illustrate 
the phenomena. The first example trades on the seeming incompatibility 
of love and hate.
(1) ' Kurt loves his best friend
(2) Kurt hates his wife's lover
It is said that we cannot hold
(3) . Kurt loves his wife's lover
when we are given the identity Kurt's best friend = Kurt's wife's lover. 
So this is meant to show that there is an intensional notion of love. 
Some mighb want to claim, against this, that love and hate are not
contradictories'^^), gut even if we admit that it is possible to love
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and hate the same person, it might still seem that there is a sense of 
"love" which is not compatible with "hate"« It might be the case that 
there are two senses of "love", intensional and extensional. Let us see 
if such a view can be given a coherent formulation. Could we say (as 
some have) that in the intensional case, the object of love is. the 
individual concept and that in the extensional case, it is the 
individual himself? Individual concepts seem to involve the same 
difficulty that we found in Chapter I with such entities as senses or 
possible objects in the report about Aguirre's search for El Dorado.
We said that to describe Aguirre ' ssearch for El Dorado as.a search for 
a sense or a possible object amply misrepresents Aguirre's activity, since 
Aguirre sought what he believed to be an actual city. If Aguirre believed 
that El Dorado is a mere possible object, he would not have sought it in 
the jungles of South America. Reverting to love, Kurt believes that he 
loves the individual and not the individual concept, Kurt's best friend.
We can recognize and account for intensional love by distinguish­
ing "love" from "love as". In "x loves y" "love" is extensional; in 
"x loves y ^  A", "love" is still extensional but creates an
additional intensional context. Applying this to the present example, 
if we just say (3) by itself and leave it at that, then it sounds as 
if it might abbreviate
(3)' Kurt loves his wife's lover as his wife's lover
or
(3)" Kurt loves his wife's lover and in loving him 
thinks of him under the description "lover of 
my wife".
Clearly both are false. But if (3) is arrived at by substituting in
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(1)., it does not mean (3)' or (3)"» If we go back to the fundamental 
form of (1) we have
(1) Kurt loves his best friend as his best friend
Substituting in (1)° we have
(3)° Kurt loves his wife’s lover as his best friend
for we substitute only in the transparent position after "love" and not 
in the opaque position after "as". (3)° is clearly true. Reading (3)
as (3)° seems to resolve the apparent conflict the extensional notion 
of "love" created^“^ \
A second example is
(4) Dcinte loved Beatrice.
Historians and interpreters of Dante disagree about the existence of 
(21 )Beatrice . It seems that there was a certain person called Beatrice,
the daughter of Folco Portinari, whom Dante met when he was at the age
(22)
of nine, and she at the age of eight , The facts about this Beatrice 
are lost. She married and later died at the age of twenty five. Dante 
made no attempt to approach Beatrice. He saw her once in the street 
and another time at a banquet some years after their initial encounter.
Now it may be said that even if there was such a person as 
Beatrice in Florence at that time, it cannot have been this person that 
Dante.loved. Certainly it may be said that he did not love the daughter 
of Folco Portinari, though if Beatrice was any body she was the daughter 
of Folco Portinari.
Let us take Dante's own account of his love for Beatrice in 
Vita Nuova and in Divine Comedy. In Dante's description of that 
phenomenon it is not a woman of Florence but the image of the forstate
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of salvation, the vision of perfection that Dante adored. Having had 
only a few brief, unintended chance encounters with Beatrice, Dante 
cannot have Imo’wn the person. The qualities of virtue, nobility, purity, 
that he attributed to Beatrice had to do with the image, the vision of 
Beatrice that Dante formed, and not with the person. Dante's description 
of his love for Beatrice is like that of a mystical experience. The kind 
oi worship and adoration that accompanied Dante's love, we can say, are 
characteristic of romantic love or courtly love tradition in Dante's time. 
It is a love of a non-existent idealized picture or image. To say that 
such phenomena are not love would be to impoverish and limit the notion 
of love against the established convention regarding a form of love.
By appealing to the background of such convention and seeing Dante.'s 
love of Beatrice as exemplifying a special form of love, rather than 
attempting to analyse Dante's state of mind, we want to show that Dante's 
case was not an isolated incident of no generalizable interest or 
something which can be paraphrased away in some way that has nothing 
to do with love. The key is the intensionality of "as ..." in "loving
Although Dante's case seems to present a stronger argument for 
intensionality of love than the first example, the same analysis via 
"love as" can be extended to give an adequate account. In general, the 
decision about extensional and intensional sense of predicates is not 
a matter of coming up with a doctrine which tells us which is the right 
reading but as Quine has put, in connection with transparent and opaque 
beliefs,"what is wanted is a way.of indicating selectively and change- 
ably just what position in the contained sentence are to shine through
(23)
as referential on any particular occassion" .
Dante's love of Beatrice illustrates how illusory is the 
prospect of substitutivity breaking down without existential
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generalization, breaking down. When we uncover the logical form 
X loves y as A, we see that neither is violated® The y-position 
continues to be transparent, even though the A position is opaque.
What happens in ordinary English where the structure is hidden is that 
the opacity of the A position confuses us into thinking of the verb 
itself as having an intensional object place.
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CHAPTER TV
REFERENCE
A . PRELIMINARY REMARKS
Before v/e attempt to give an analysis of "refer", which is the 
verb which all the foregoing discussion was designed to lead up to, wo 
need to examine the range of examples to be accounted for by such an 
analysiso When v/e collect a full house of examples, the phenomena
which raise the problem of empty reference can be divided into at least
four types.
I. Speech act notion of "refer"
(1 ) Leverrier referred to Vulcan .
(2) Leverrier referred to Vulcan as the planet
which disturbs the perihelion of Mercury.
(3) Leverrier referred to a planet .
(4) Scientists referred to caloric as the fluid
which constituted heat.
(3) Schliemann referred to the site of Troy.
(6) Ponce de Leon referred to the Fountain of Youth.
(7) Bently referred to Ossian.
(8) The Scots refer to the Loch Ness Monster.
II.. Semantic notion of "refer"
(9) "Vulcan" refers to Vulcan.
(10) "Vulcan" refers to a planet.
(11) "Vulcan" refers to the planet wliich aisvurbs
the perihelion of Mercury.
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Vacuous terms in extensional contexts
(12) Vulcan is a planet.
(13) Vulcan = Vulcan.
(14) Vulcan disturbs the perihelion of Mercury.
(13) Vulcan exists.
(16) Leverrier discovered Vulcan.
IV. Vacuous terms in fiction and myth
(17) Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street.
(18) Aphrodite = Venus.
(19) Aphrodite is the goddess of love who was born
from the sea.
(20) Homer referred to Achilles.
The speech act notion of reference is a three-place relation
(24)
between a speaker, a term, and its reference t The semantic notion 
of reference is a two place relation between a term and its reference. 
V/e are concerned with vacuous singular terms in serious discourse which 
must be distinguished from fiction. But as a byproduct of our analysis 
of I-lII, we might have a solution to IV.
Whether an adequate account of the phenomena in I-IV requires 
more than one notion of reference is a question that can be better 
answered when we have examined the notion of reference in I & II. But 
there are some preliminary remarks we can offer. On the surface, the 
three place relation of speech act reference seems clearly different 
from the two place relation of semantic reference. As Kripke has 
pointed out, the speech act referent of 'x" is not always x but can 
be sometimes y or z, if the speaker has some appropriate mistaken
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(23)
beliefs . The semantic referent of "x" is always x. The speech 
act notion involves speaker’s intentions and beliefs in determining 
the reference of a term. We shall see how the two notions are related 
when we apply the Quinean strategy to both.
B. SPEEni-l ACT REFERENCE
The issue of intensionality of speech act reference turns on 
how we decide to treat the phenomena that are expressed by the sentences 
of class I, such as
(1) Leverrier referred to Vulcan.
(3) Scientists referred to caloric.
There are two possibilities. First, we might accept these sentences as 
prima facie true, i.e. they are given as historical facts. Then in 
order to explain their truth grounds we must postulate an intensional 
notion of "refer"® For if we have only the extensional notion of "refer", 
given the standard procedure of stating truth conditions in terms of the 
reference of components, we cannot state the truth conditions if the 
components lack reference. Still less can these sentences receive the 
valuation True.
On the other hand we might, it may be said, interpret the 
sentences of class I as false. Since there is no such entity as Vulcan 
or substance as caloric, Leverrier did not refer to Vulcan, and 
scientists did not refer to caloric. If the sentences of the form 
"a refers to x" are never true, when "x" is empty, it might be suggested 
that we have no need for an intensional notion of "refer". But this 
interpretation simply makes "refer" extensional by fiat. To deny that 
sentences of class I are true on the ground that we cannot refer to
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non-existent entities presupposes the extensionality of "refer" and 
leaves sentences of class I unexplained.
The uncompromising extensionalist view entails some implausible 
consequences. First, v/e cannot have any correct report of mistaken 
acts of reference. If we take (1) and (2) to be false on the basis 
that Leverrier cannot have referred to Vulcan since Vulcan does nou 
exist, then v/e cannot distinguish (1) and (2), correct reports of 
Leverrier’s belief from incorrect reporbs such as
Leverrier referred to Vulcan as a falling star.
It is not as if he v/ho says that Leverrier referred to Vulcan as the 
cause of the disturbance of the perihelion of Mercury might just as 
well have said that Leverrier referred to El Dorado as the cause of 
the disturbance.
Furthermore, if we follow the extensionalist in his reasoning 
for denying the truth of (1) and (2), then ought we not to have denied 
the truth of sentences such as
Aguirre sought El Dorado.
The Greeks worshipped Zeus.
on the same grounds? Given that El Dorado and Zeus do not exist, 
Aguirre did not seek El Dorado and the Greeks did not worship Zeus,
But such an interpretation cannot be right.
So we can see the apparent need for an intensional notion of 
"refer", jusb as we perceived a need for intensional notions of "seek" 
and "worship". The fact that we continually seek, worship, etc. 
non-existents cannot be denied. What is needed is for these concepts 
to be analysed. To account for the activities of search and worship
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v/e had to postulate and analyse intensional notions of "seek", and 
"worship". Analogously, the fact that people refer to non-existents 
while having mistaken beliefs about the nature of such entities, 
should be a good reason for introducing an intensional notion of "refer",
C. OITR SOLUTION TO THE SENTENCES OF CLASS I 
FOLLOWS QUINE'S PATTERN
Let us suppose that "refer" can be paraphrased as "purport
/ pg \
to mention" and that "mention" is extensional • It might be thought 
that "purport" is not an appropriate proposit i onal attitude here, '//e 
could go over some other propositional attitudes for the purpose of 
adding variety or refinement to our paraphrase. But this would distract 
froi(i our main purpose, which relates to logical form.
Applying Quine’s strategy to
(3) Leverrier referred to a planet
we have
(3)' (3x) (x is a planet. Leverrier purported
of X that he mentions x)
and
(3)" Leverrier purported that ( 3 x) (x is a planet.
Leverrier mentions x).
as the relational and the notional readings of (3)• The correct 
Quinean reading for
(1) Leverrier referred to Vulcan
is
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(1)' Leverrier purported that (3x) (x is Vulcan.
Leverrier mentions x).
As we have shown with
Aguirre sought El Dorado
the relational as well as the notional reading is to be taken as being 
about a parti cular place® So (1)’, unlike the notional reading of (3), 
does not say that Leverrier referred to just any object. The justification 
for tills was that the singular terms "Vulcan", "El Dorado", import 
particularity - or leather for Leverrier and Aguirre they do. Applying 
the strategy we have adopted for (1) and (3) to other sentences con­
taining the notion of speech act reference is straight forward. We 
conclude that a Quinean strategy will give us a satisfactory solution 
for sentences containing empty names and the speech act notion of 
reference.
D. SEMANTIC REFERENCE
We come now to semantic reference. Adopting Quine's strategy 
once again, we might define "refer" as "purport to mention", as we have 
in defining speech act notion of reference. It might be thought that 
Quine's strategy for intensional predicates even if it is plausible for 
sentences with the speech act notion of reference, cannot be applied to • 
sentences with the semantic notion of reference. Because here, there is 
no question of speakers holding any attitudes towards propositions. But 
we can say the following in answering this objection and show the 
connection between the two notions of reference. It seems plausible 
to hold that semantic reference can be intensional provided that speech 
act reference can be intensional® A word which semantically refers is 
cut out, designed b,y its semantic role, for use by speakers for speaKer
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reference. So we could say that if Leverrier purported to mention 
Vulcan by "Vulcan", then "Vulcan" itself, at least in one standard use, 
purports to mention Vulcan.
Why not then paraphrase (9) as
(9)’ "Vulcan" (by its presence as a constituent of 
a sentence making an assertion) purports that 
(3 x) (x is Vulcan & "Vulcan" mentions x)?
(10) could then be rendered as
(10)’ "Vulcan" (by its presence in a sentence) purports 
that (3 x) (x is a planet & "Vulcan" mentions x)®
If (9)' and (10)’ could be taken as the correct rendering of (9) and
(10), then we should have shovm that "Vulcan" semantically refers 
and how sentences containing empty terms and the semantic notion of . 
reference could be evaluated. What makes this T;ossihle is that although 
there is no sucii planet as Vulcan, the language which Leverrier spoke 
depended at, at least, one point in the supposition that there was.
To explain what ha meant, Leverrier himself would have said something 
of this form:
By "Vulcan" I mean Vulcan - a planet which 
will prove to be disturbing the perihelion 
of Mercury.
We cannot say this of course, because we loiow there is no such planet. 
But surely this would not prevent us from understanding Leverrier or 
Leverrier's language.
Tills is scarcely a fully worked out idea; but for my purpose, 
and- for purposes of logical form, it will be enough for us so be able 
to go on in due course to what directly concerns me.
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E. APPLICATION OF THE INTENSIONAL NOTION OF 
REFERENCE TO SENTEI^ ICES WITH EMPTY TERMS 
IN EXTENSIONAL CONTEXTS
Does the intensional notion of reference explained in 
section D help us to evaltiate sentences such as
(12) Vulcan is a planet.
(l4) Vulcan disturbs the perihelion.of Mercury?
In (12) and (14) there is no appearance of an intensional predicate.
So these sentences seem to require quite a different treatment. We 
conclude that, even if we may have succeeded in showing the plausibility 
of the intensional notion of speech act and semantic reference, that in 
itself does not help us in evaluating sentences such as (12) and (14) 
even if it motivates us to try harder than certain philosophers have 
thought it necessary to do this® To show that "a" semantically refers 
in the sense so far defined does not answer the question: what is the
truth-value of "Fa" when "a" is vacuous? For when "Fa" is an extionsional 
predicate, to evaluate "Fa" we have to see whether F is true of a. When 
there is no a, we cannot by the procedures presupposed in our ovm 
definition of "refer", via "mention" evaluate "Fa", We have as yet 
no way of evaluating any of the sentences in class III. Nobody who 
takes seriously the sentences in class III will be content with this 
situation. And it is this aspect of the problem of empty reference 
which will concern us for the rest of this thesis. In the following 
chapter, we shall examine the various approaches for evaluating the 
sentences in class III.
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CHAPTER V
STANDARD FORMAL SEMANTICS FOR REFERENCE
It is obvious that the semantics of empty names cannot be given
by any standard theory. But in order to see what an extension or
adaptation of the standard theory would have to be like, and in order to
characterize the semantic contribution of empty names, it is necessary
to approach the problem via the standard theory. This theory is not
entirely neutral because in the extension of Tarski's theory of truth
to languages containing individual constants which we have borrowed 
( 27)from Mendelson there is an inbuilt prejudice in favour of the idea 
that to say what a name means is to say what iz stands for. And that 
is not obviously an uncontroversial idea. So when I get to that point 
I shall defend the idea and try to show that it is less controversial
than it looks; and that formal semantics may therefore provide a
neutral framework.
Frege held that to state the meaning of a sentence is to state 
the conditions under which it is true. Davidson has suggested that 
this is what is accomplished by a Tarskian theory of truth conforming 
to
Convention T® A formally correct definition of the 
symbol 'True', formulated in the metalanguage, will be 
called an adequate definition of truth if it has as 
consequence all sentences which are obtained from the 
expression 'x 8 Tr' (i.e. x is in the class of true 
sentences) if and only if p by substituting for the
symbol 'x' a structural descriptive name of any sentence
of the language in question, and for the symbol 'p'.
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the expression which forms the translation of this 
sentence into the metalanguage^^^\
The notion of translation which Tarski employs here is open to Quine's 
criticisms and might appear to make Davidson's project circular.
Davidson has two ways with this problem. First in detailed technical 
work he concentrates on the case where object language is part of 
metalanguage, blocking thereby all perverse methods of assigning to 
every sentence x, even though x does not mean that p, a condition p 
such that
• True X = p.
This is called the "homophonie" way. Suppose that there is a theory 
of truth 0 such that for every sentence x, 0 has a theorem of the form
\r True X = p
Suppose that every such equivalence given by 0 is true. Then there 
are infinitely many variant theories of 0 ' of truth, constructed out 
of 9 as follows.
H  O' True x = p (8c 2x2=4)
All these equivalences will be true if 0 was true. What is more, these
(29)
variant theories use the notion of truth essentially ® The point is
that the variants fail Tarski's translation condition. Only in the case 
where object and metalanguage are part and whole is there any purely 
formal method of ascertaining that the translation condition is met.
The answer to this problem is this. 0 is a correct theory of
interpretation if 0 is true and meets all of Tarski's other requirements 
besides translation and 0 also optimally fits all native speakers
holdings true. Optimally is meant here in the sense of minimizing
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the supposition of unexplained error in the beliefs which an inter­
preter using 0 would find himself ascribing to the speakers of the 
language. This is the principle of charity or of humanity.
Davidson thus has a way of displacing the word "translation"
altogether from Convention T, in terms of a holistic non-formal
requirement on theories of truth. This concerns the propositional
attitudes of belief and desire. For our purpose it is sufficient that
( 30 )
some account like this should,be possible .
By Tarski's theory of truth, truth is defined as satisfaction 
by all sequences. Tarskd gave the theory for a formal language but he 
stated that such a definition as his, owing to its universality, can
(31 )be applied to natural language in so far as they can be made precise 
In extending Tarski's definition of truth to natural languages there 
are some modifications we need to make. But the basic strategy is the 
same: ( 1 ) distinction of object language (the l.anguage for which the
truth definition is given), and metalanguage (the language in which the 
definition is given), to avoid the semantic paradoxes; (2) an inter­
pretation function which takes terms as arguments and objects as values;
(3) a recursive definition of satisfaction for sentential functions;
(4) definition of truth via satisfaction.
We shall not attempt to give an exposition of the whole orthodox 
theory but show how it can deal with names and in what way it must fail 
(as it stands) to define truth for sentences with empty names. We 
suppose that the sentences being characterized belong to English.
Consider a sentence of the form: Ft, where "F" is some
primitive predicate and t is some term. Truth for this sentence (as for 
all other sentences) is satisfaction by all sequences. And for the
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sentence ”Ft" the relevant satisfaction provision is, where s is a 
sequence variable,
(s) (s satisfies "Ft" iff s*(t) is F)^^"\
We have a similar clause for each primitive predicate of the language 
(which is a sublanguage of English)» The definition of the s* function 
is as follows. Where t is a variable 'xi' we have
(s) (s*'xq* = the i-bh member of s).
Where t is a name ’a ’, we have
(s) (s* ’a> = a).
In a definition of truth for a language T, there will be a clause like 
this for each proper name which has a denotation. The mere schema will 
not enable us to say what each name actually means.
According to Davidson, the connection between Tarski's 
definition of truth and the concept of meaning is this:
the definition works by giving necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the truth of every 
sentence, and to give truth conditions is a way 
of giving the meaning of a sentence. To know 
the semantic concept of truth for a language 
is to know what it is for a sentence - any 
sentence - to be true, and this amounts, in one 
good sense we can give to the phrase, to under­
standing the language^^^/.
Davidson maintains that any semantic proposal, if it is to be part of a 
systematic attempt to give in the end the semantics of the whole of the 
language, must be stated in a metalanguage which does not make use of 
concepts that are not directly required in understanding the object 
l a n g u a g e ^ T h e  homophonie way is particularly useful in this 
connection. The metalanguage is employed as a means of defining the
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truth and meaning for the object language. As such it should not 
exceed the expressive resources of the object language except in as 
much as the metalanguage contains the extra predicate "true". This 
requirement will be very important, and when we use it later against 
certain theories, we shall say some more about it.
Postponing the problem of empty names, how well does this 
theory satisfy the other criteria for a semantic theory of names? It 
might seem that in this framework we are forced to say that "Hesperus" 
means the same as "Phosphorus". For clearly
s*("Hesperus") = Hesperus = Phosphorus.
And this Mill-Russell result seems to throw away everything which 
Frege achieved in "On Sense and Reference". But although the above 
statement of equivalence is true, it does not amount, even for a 
Davidsonian, to "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" having the same sense.. Of 
course, if we had
)r 0s*("Hesperus") = s*("Phosphorus")
within a truth theory 0, maybe that would entail that "Hesperus" and 
"Phosphorus" had to have the same sense. But this could not be proved 
within the truth theory unless we had within it
0 Hesperus = Phosphorus.
But within the truth theory itself we cannot show that "Hesperus" and 
"Phosphorus" have the same reference. So we cannot show there that 
they have the same sense. In the truth theory 0, "Hesperus" refers 
Hesperus iff
(a) hOs*("Hesperus") = Hesperus.
And "Hesperus" refers to Phosphorus iff
(b) I"03*("Hesperus") = Phosphorus.
But how could (b) be proved in the truth theory? "Hesoerus = Phosphorus" 
is not a tneoremc of any truth theory but indicates a non-linguistic 
fact.
Another wsy of putting this is as follows. It is true that 
s*("Hesperus") = Phosphorus. So the s* context is extensional. But 
(- 0s*("Hesperus") = Phosporus puts the sentence "s*("Hesperus") = 
Phosphorus", and its terms into a position which is intenslonal. That 
" }-0" creates an opaque context suggests a way of coming to terms with 
the apparent intensionality of "refer". We may try saying that "Hesperus" 
refers to Phosphorus iff (5 0) ((0 is a correct truth theory for the
interpretation of the language in question) 8c f"0s*("Hesperus") = 
Phosphorus), s* is extensional out ifh0(s*( ) = ( )) creates an opaque
context, then so does "refer" on this analysis.
The method of formal semantics is not then committed to
"Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" having the same sense. The theory can be
seen as saying that to fix the reference is to fix the sense without
saying that two names having the same reference must have the same 
(55)sense , There is nothing to prevent it from allowing for the 
obvious difference of sense between sentences such as
Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline.
and
Tom believes that Tully denounced Catiline.
It may seem that this brings us dangerously close to the description
theory of proper names which Frege expounded in "On Sense and Reference"
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and which has been frequently criticized recently. The description 
theory must always seem an attractive alternative for those who want, 
as we do, to make sense of empty names. If it were right, it would help 
us. But the formal semantical framework does not commit us to it. And 
that is, in fact, Ihcky.
According to the description theory, the sense of a proper name 
is given by some definite description that is sufficient to determine 
the reference associated with the name. The sense of "Vulcan" could be 
"the planet which disturbs the perihelion of Mercury", and the sense of 
"Aristotle" could be "the teacher of Alexander". Kripke and others have 
pointed out the difficulties of this view. The general form of the main 
difficulty can be characterized as follows^^^^. Let " x/x" be some 
supposed synonym of a proper name n, and sufficient to determine its 
reference. Then whore b is n's bearer, if " x/x" had the sense of n, 
then "If b exists then b is /" could not be false. But such a statement, 
when b is an ordinary object, can certainly be false. It follows that 
proper names cannot have their sense in the way Frege’s theory explains.
But the way we explained that the formal semantic theory avoids 
identifying the senses of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" and the senses of 
"Cicero" and "Tully" are not involved in the replacing of proper names 
by descriptions or the giving of descriptions as synonyms for proper 
names. If somebody needs to knov/ the sense of the name "Hesperus", we 
can tell him what it stands for. Even though Hesperus = Phosphorus, 
saying "it stands for Hesperus" is not the same as saying "it stands 
for Phosphorus". And of the two specifications of the sense of "Hesperus" 
the first is greatly to be preferred. They could only be equally good if 
the two names were notational variants. They are not notational variants 
’in this case. Tliis can be seen by thinking what supplementary
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explanations - not synonyms for "Hesperus" - would be natural to use
with the explanation "it stands for Hesperus". These would be given
by descriptions relating to the evening (when Hesperus rises). Both
Wiggins and Kripke have stressed how such supplementary explanations
of what, which heavenly body, one means by a name are not given in
( 37)order that they should be understood as synonyms o
Empty names then are the only obvious difficulty in the standard 
formal semantic approach. ' They are a di ^ 'ficulty in that the theory has 
not provided for them. This is not to say that the theory provides 
against them. What we need is to see how if at all, we can extend the 
standard theory to take in empty names. The difficulties of doing this 
do not come out of any bias within the theory against empty names. The 
standard theory is neutral. The same difficulties arise in one form or 
another on every approach - except perhaps on some versions of the 
description theory ' . But that theory has been refuted.
Suppose that the object language contained an empty term "Vulcan". 
Then it is empty in the metalanguage too. "s*("Vulcan")" by itself has 
no value since "Vulcan" is empty. The truth conditions for sentences 
such as
Vulcan is a planet.
Vulcan disturbs the perihelion of Mercury.
cannot then be stated since "s*("Vulcan")" is not available. The same 
difficulty actually arises earlier. Consider the semantic stipulation
s*("Vulcan")- = Vulcan,
This has to be put forward as a truth of the metalinguistic theory of 
truth for the object language. But if "Vulcan" is empty, then it cannot 
even have a truth value in the standard theory.
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In the standard theory s* has a value for every argument.
When we add empty terms to the language, s* then becomes a partial 
function. There exists no value for s*("a") when "a" is an empty 
terra. In a standard semantic theory, even when "refer" is taken to be 
intensional because "a" refers to a = f-0s*("a") = a and H0s* is
intensional, we still have no means of evaluating sentences containing 
empty terms in extensional position. Until this difficulty is resolved 
even the intensional notion of "refer" will not help us to say that 
Leverrier referred to Vulcan.
It is well worth noting that the same difficulty would 
embarrass the description theory if it claimed to have any advantage 
for this problem, and if it claimed to explain the sense of "Vulcan" 
by "Vulcan is the planet which disturbs the perihelion of Mercury".
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CHAPTER VI
EMPTY REFERENCE : PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION
There are two possible reactions to the failure of the orthodox 
truth theory in explaining the meaning of empty singular terms and the 
truth conditions of sentences with empty names. The first is the 
approach taken by Geach, and by Kripke to a certain extentwhich 
treats such sentences as actually meaningless, and empty names as 
having no semantic role. The rationale behind this approach would be 
that names get their meaning by naming their objects and when there are 
no objects corresponding to the names, we cannot say anything meaning­
ful about them. The second approach insists on taking sentences 
containing empty names as expressing genuine thoughts, and treats 
empty names as making semantic contributions to sentences in which 
they occur. There are several different methods within this approach.
We shall examine both approaches in turn.
For Geach the notion of "refer" or "name" is strictly extensional
Geach argues, in agreement with Parmenides, that one cannot name what is
(39)not there to be named «. Geach is concerned with "how we can re­
describe such occurrences as worshipping an imaginary God or dreaming 
of an imaginary girl, without admitting that there are imaginary gods 
and g i r l s , G e a c h  defends his view that we cannot name imaginary 
beings by framing what has subsequently been called "the causal theory 
of naming".
For Geach it is built into the notion of name that a name must
(41)be a name of an existent object. In Reference and Generality Geach 
appeals to "acts of naming" to explain what a name is. A name is said
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to be a term that can be used in an act of naming. But it is not very-
clear what an act of naming is: saying "Hello Cat'." upon seeing a cat
is considered by Geach as an act of naming. We would not normally regard
"cat" as a name. In "The perils of Pauline", Geach brings in the acts 
(42)
of baptism . For a word to be a name, we have to be able, in theory
if not in practice, to follow the historical chain of usage to trace the
introduction of the name. Both in the acts of naming and the acts of
baptism, what is being appealed to is that names are introduced into
the language ostensively. The initial users of a name have to be
acquainted with the object named, or have to be in a situation where
( i+3)
they can point at the object named » Such an account of names would 
certainly succeed in discarding empty names as names. But this elimin­
ation by itself does not explain the phenomena of empty reference.
Empty names are a part of language and the phenomena of empty reference 
needs to be explained.
In order to take care of empty names, Geach introduces the notion
of "quasi-name". Names that are used without existential presupposition
about their bearers function as quasi-names. "Zeus" would be a quasi­
name for us. When a name is used as a quasi-name, what the speaker
refers to is other people's intention to refer to an object by that 
(4M
name , This might be plausible for Geach's example about the legend 
of Arthur but not for "Zeus". In the case of "Zeus", what we referred 
to is a god believed by the Greeks to exist and not their intention to 
refer to a god. We want to be able to ascribe beliefs to speakers 
without accepting the beliefs ourselves. Geach's solution would be 
that in reporting "Smith believes that the hill fort was built by 
Arthur", "Arthur" is used as a quasi-name by us. We do not refer by 
"Arthur" to Arthur but Smith's intention to refer to Arthur. There is 
a resemblance between Geach's solution and Church's interpretation of
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( 45)Frege's analysis of oblique reference . In oblique contexts, we 
were told that a name has its normal sense as the reference. In Geach's 
solution a name stands for the intention of the se^aker. Davidson's 
objection in ("On Saying That" and elsewhere) to Frege's analysis of 
oblique contexts, that it is implausible to maintain that a name gives 
up its pedestrian reference and picks up an exotic entity, seems to 
apply to Geach's solution equally.
(It is difficult not to feel that Geach has put his ovm proposal 
in an unfortunate way. I do not like the way it is put. But there may 
be some similarity between his general approach to the problem of empty 
reference and that into which I am driven at the end of this thesis.)
An approach which takes empty names more seriously than Geach's 
seems more promising. It is certainly not obvious that sentences such 
as "Vulcan is a planet" are strictly meaningless. So, inasmuch as in 
the standard theory of truth we cannot assign truth conditions to 
sentences with empty names, we need to try to modify or extend the 
standard theory to do this.
One way of dealing with empty terms has been to make sentences 
containing them to be without a determinate truth value. We have 
already suggested that this is at best half of a solution. For we still 
need to be able to assert in the metalanguage something true of the form 
s*(n) = b for each naiue n. That is a difficulty we shall struggle with,
But Dumraett has sho'wn that there is even a prior difficulty.
(46)
D'ummett expounds the difficulty as follows . A popular 
account of the meaning of the word "true" is that "It is true that p" 
has the same sense as p, i.e. T^p^ = p. This explanation of "is 
true" determines uniquely the sense, or at least the application, of 
this predicate: for any given proposition there is a sentence
expressing that proposition, and that sentence states the conditions
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under which the proposition is true If we admit truth-value
gaps, this explanation appears incorrect. Suppose p contains a singular 
term which lacks a reference, then the approach under discussion takes 
p as lacking a truth-value. p therefore is not true, and hence the 
statement "It is true that p" will be false, "p will therefore not 
have the same sense as "It is true that p" since the latter is false 
while the former is not... In general it will always be inconsistent 
to maintain the truth of every instance of "It is true that p iff p" 
while allowing that there is a type of sentence which under certain 
conditions is neither true nor false.
We see in this way that truth value gaps conflict with Convention 
T. Convention T requires that an adequate theory of truth should yield 
as a theorem for any sentence p, a biconditional of the form T ^p"* = p.
To question T^ p"' = p, therefore, amounts to questioning Tarski's
requirement - at least in the precise form he gave it. Theories which 
accept truth value gaps would have to provide a new criterion of material 
adequacy. '
Dummett's argument provides a very handy way of classifying non- 
orthodox theories and their consequential treatments of sentences 
containing empty singular terms. Let us see how the incompatibility 
between the truth value gaps and the equivalence T^p”* s p can be 
resolved. There are four possible ways: (0) Reject both truth value 
gaps and T^pi = p; (1) Reject truth value gaps and retain T^ p"' = p;
(2) Reject T ^p"* f p and retain truth value gaps; (3) Retain both.
Possibility (0) has not been taken up anywhere; since it has 
no obvious virtues, we shall not discuss it.
There is a hybrid theory between (2) and (3) which, space allowing, 
I would like to examine in the appendix. It does not advance the main 
argument.
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In the following chapters we shall discuss each of the other 
possibilities.
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CHAPTER VII
REJECTION OF TRUTH VALUE GAPS AND 
RETENTION OF T^p * s p : FREGE'S THEORY
Frego has given two different accounts of sentences containing
empty singular terms. On the surface the account given in the Grund-
gesetze which rejects truth value gaps might appear to be incompatible 
with the account given in "On Sense and Reference" which admits truth 
value gaps. We shall expound both accounts. The reason for classifying 
Frege's proposal under the type which rejects truth-value gaps is that 
Frege's proposal in Grundgesetze is intended for serious discourse.which 
is our present concern. And the account given in "On Sense and Reference"
is intended for fiction or myth.
In Grundgesetze, in the formal language that Frege sets up, the 
formation rules for singular terms state that properly constructed names
( 49)
must always have reference , This means that, names, descriptions, 
and sentences (since for Frege they are names of truth values) are 
required to have reference. This amounts to rejecting truth value gaps. 
But the formation rules do not guarantee that empty terms shall be 
excluded from the language. As Frege points out, even in the language 
of mathematics we cannot prevent the occurrence of empty terras such as 
"the divergent infinite s e r i e s " F r e g e  does-not disregard empty 
terms as lacking in semantic significance but proposes a remedy.
Frege's stipulation for singular terms implies that the null class,A
(51)be the reference of all singular terms that are empty « To be 
precise, Frege's stipulation is formulated for definite descriptions.
But since Frege treats definite descriptions on a par with proper names, 
we could extend the stipulation to cover empty names in applying Frege's
53
theory to our problem of evaluating sentences with empty names in 
extensional contexts. Empty terms are reduced to non-empty terms by 
the stipulation. As we shall see, this creates some difficulty.
Given the stipulation, the evaluation of some of the sentences 
of group II, Chapter IV, is straight forward. " 'Vulcan* refers to 
Vulcan" would be true, since according to the rule "Vulcan" refers to 
A • "Vulcan = Vulcan" would be true since " A  = A "  is clearly true. 
"Vulcan is a planet" would be false since A  is not a planet, and the 
same for "Vulcan disturbs the perihelion of Mercury", "Vulcan is not 
a planet" would be true.
The equivalence T^ p~* = p is retained, for if "Vulcan is a
planet" is false, then "It is true that Vulcan is a planet" is also 
false.
It might seem that such an assignment of truth values corresponds 
with our intuitions about sentences containing emtpy names. But there 
are some difficulties with this account. One of the consequences of 
positing A  as the reference of all empty singular terms is that 
A = Vulcan = Zeus = the round square = the golden mountain, etc. 
This upsets any notion of identity we might have about such entities, and 
any prospect of a natural treatment of natural language.
Furthermore, existential statements cannot be evaluated correctly, 
We would want to say that "Vulcan exists" is false. But " /\ exists" 
would have to be true given that A is the reference of " A  ". If " A " 
itself were empty, there would be no point to the stipulation which 
makes it the reference of empty terms. This difficulty is directly 
connected with the reduction of empty names to non-enpty names by 
assigning /\ as their reference. In order to evaluate "Vulcan exists"
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as false, "Vulcan" must remain an empty name. We cannot go in to an]/ 
of the problems of existential statements in this thesi.s. But we also 
cannot let pass a theory which renders those problems insoluable.
In Frege's account empty names are recognized as such. If, as 
in his formal treatment, they are then assigned a reference, he comes 
perilously close to maintaining that they are simultaneously empty and 
non-empty. In general, all reductionist treatment of empty singular 
terms seem to entail some such implausibility. (Other reductionist 
theories we shall consider are those of Scott and Grandy.)
Frege himself would not perhaps consider this as a valid
objection. The matter is complicated by the fact that regards "exist" 
as a second level predicate so that sentences such as "Vulcan exists" 
might be considered by him to be meaningless. However, we can take 
such a sentence as meaningful as (3x) (x = Vulcan), That seems to 
mean that Vulcan exists.
For sentences of fiction, Frege has a solution which should be
sharply distinguished from his solution for sentences containing serious
empty names. In "On Sense and Reference" Frege regards sentences of
( 52)fiction to be truth-valueless • Frege's view that when we know the
context of fiction, we have no reason for going forward to the question
of truth values, seems to put fiction in its right place. But this view
does not help us with serious discourse about non-existent entities, for
(53)we need to evaluate sentences in such a discourse. '
In the next two chapters we shall discuss Scott's modification
of Frege's account and Grandy's modification of Scott's account: ',
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CHAPTER VIII
REJECTION OF TRUTH VALUE GAPS AND RETENTION OF T^ -p* = p
(Continued) : SCOTT'S "EXISTENCE AND DESCRIPTION IN
FORMAL LOGIn,, (54)
Scott proposes a system in which empty descriptions and sentences 
containing them can be evaluated. We shall be concerned with the obvious 
extension of Scott's system to singular terms in general. We shall 
expound only the relevant parts of the system in such an extension, but 
our observations will apply equally to the original account. We shall 
then discuss to what extent Scott's claim is justified that his account 
is an improvement of the proposal Frege discussed in. the previous section.
. Scott states tliree motivating principles that have guided the
(55)precise formulation of his theory
Principle 1. Bound variables should range 
over the given domain of individuals.
Principle 2. The domain of individuals 
should be allowed to be empty.
Principle 3o The values of terms and free 
variables need not belong to the domain of 
. individuals.
Scotb's general strategy is to have two domains for the universe of 
discourse: the inner or actual .domain consisting of individuals and
the outer domain consisting of *, which corresponds to A  in Frege's 
proposal. Principle 1 amounts to the usual treatment of the range of 
quantifiers and requires no special explanation. Principle 2 is 
interesting because it establishes Scott's theory as based on "universally
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free logic"^^^^. An advocate of universally free logic might offer the
following reasons in its defense. Principle 2 appears to be a sound
guiding principle for logic, because it cannot be a proper concern in
formulating logical laws that some objects exist. Quine objects to
admitting the empty domain on the ground that (1) it involves a modification
of the standard laws e.g. universal instantiation and existential
generalization; (2) the empty domain has no practical importance; (5)
we can keep the general laws and simply state the special provisions
( 57)for the empty domain « In answer to Quine’s objections, it might be 
said, as Quine himself has said in a different context, that matters of 
fact should not be forced on matters of logic^^^^* The standard systems 
of logic simply start with the assumption that the domain is not empty.
From the point of application, this assumption is not unreasonable. But 
it might be said on Scott's behalf that for a general system universally 
free logic without any existential presuppositions is much more reasonable.
Principle 3 is very important for the basic idea of Scott's 
system. Scott exhibits the usefulness of Principle 3 us follows.
Consider the question raised by Mostowski in connection with the empty 
comain^^^^.
Namely, it is 'clear' that the formula 
xRx —>■ xRx
is valid in all domains including the empty one. Similarly 
the sentence
(xRx-^xRx)— î^^y (yPy-fyPy)
is valid, because if x is given a value in the domain, then 
there is some value of y to satisfy the formula within the 
quantifier. On the other hand, the formula
3 y
is not valid in the empty domain: hence the valid formulas
are not closed under the rule of modus ponens when the empty
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domain is included. The fallacy (or better inconvenience) 
here lies in allowing the second formula to be valid. The 
first formula is completely valid no matter what value 
we assign to x. The second formula will fail in the 
empty domain, however, if we recognize Principle 3» To 
have a valid formula we must modify the implication to 
read:
(xRx -^xRx) A 3:/ (x=y) “n? ^ y  (yRy
What this discussion establishes is that when the empty domain 
is admitted, the rule of existential generalization must be modified to 
Fa A ( 3 x) (x=a) t" (5.x) Fx.
Principle 3 leads directly to Scott’s postulating the existence 
of at least one * outside the domain of the quantifiers. Under Principle 
3 we no longer require the value of terms to be given within the domain.
* is to be the value of all improper singular terms. For each domain A, 
we assign a null entity * such that A  Scott holds that to put
♦outside the domain is better than to follow Frege and have the reference 
of empty terras inside the domain^^^^. First we emphasize the impropriety 
of empty singular terms by giving their values outside the domain and 
thereby keep a natural reading of "(3x)". Second, we recognize that 
when the domain is empty, we cannot have an entity in it.
To give a' semantical interpretation for a language containing 
empty singular terms, Scott follows the standard procedure of using a 
structure, <A, , where A is a set (the domain of individuals) and
R is a binary relation (the interpretation of the predicate symbol R  )« 
Then, relative to the given structure, Scott defines inductively the 
values of formulas (which are truth values) and terms (which are objects). 
We shall not reproduce the exact clauses of the inductive definition æid 
the rules of inference and the axioms, since they are the standard ones, 
except for the clause which defines the value of empty terms as ♦, and
6o
the rule of universal installation
(UI) ¥x^/A 3x(x=<^)-^
If ¥x ^  is true, it is not correct to conclude that ^ (x/oC ) is true 
unless (A has a value in the inner domain.
Let us apply Scott’s system to the sentences containing empty 
names in extensional positions. He considers^^^^
vpR*, *Rv^, *E*
Ya=* *=Va *=*
Scott points out that when a formula has no free variables, the identity 
formulas are unproblematic. *=* is true, as an instance of the axion 
schema (S3) OC = oL • And Vj_=*, *=v^ are always false when the variable 
Vi is bound (Principle 1)« In Scott’s system we can evaluate "Vulcan= 
Vulcan", "El Dorado = El Dorado", etc. as true. Sentences such as 
"Vulcan disturbs the perihelion of Mercury" would be evaluated as false, 
since <( *, the perihelion of Mercury ^ the interpretation of the 
predicate ’disturb’. The relevant clause in Scott is
K  (s) iff II oC (s) II II (s)/I 6 R
(64)
A
Scott considers the effect of
(I^) He =  oC V  *  =  p  I   ^ .
This amounts to a restriction that the relation of a structure be 
confined to existing individuals. As Scott points out, this schema 
(l ) is not valid in Scott's system, as it is formulated. However,
3
it could be validated by choosing *^to lie outside the field of the 
relation R. But Scott considers this as undesirable because we expect 
that the valid formulas should be closed under substitution of formulas 
for predicate symbols. Clearly (I ) becomes invalid when R is replaced
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by =, if we are to keep the usual properties of identity even for non- 
existentsu
We shall conclude our exposition of Scott's system by comparing 
it with Frege's account which it proposes to replace. First, in Scott's 
system we can give a correct evaluation of "Vulcan exists". This is a 
definite advantage over Frege's account. Translating the sentence as 
(3 x) (x = Vulcan), we can evaluate it as false. Under the semantical 
rules in Scott's system (3x) (x = c<S) is true only when the value of 
exists in the actual domain^^^^. The value of "Vulcan" would be 
By putting * in the outer domain, Scott's system gives a correct 
evaluation of existential statements involving empty terms.
Scott regards it as one of the advantages of his system that 
the laws of identity are preserved. But as with Frege's account, * 
being the value of all empty terms, all identity statements involving 
any two empty names wouldte evaluated as true. And there seems little 
point in preserving self-identity for non-existent entities, if we have 
at the same time sentences such as "Vulcan = El Dorado" as true statements 
of identity. Our objection to Frege's in relation to intensional relations 
and meaning apply in their entirety to Scott's * : by means of * we still
cannot correctly describe Aguirre's search for El Dorado in particular. 
Aguirre tried to bring it about that he finds El Dorado. We only know 
what that means if we know what "he finds El Dorado" means. We cannot 
interpret that sentence in any natural way in Scott's system; though 
it is fair to say Scott could be invited to say something special to 
such cases.
Our last remark is that Scott's system will not yield a homo- 
phonic theory of truth answering to Davidson's reasonable requirement
in "Semantics for Natural Languages"l^^^There is an essential mismatch 
between the object language and the metalanguage. In the object language 
empty terms, e.g. "Vulcan" are without a value. But in the metalanguage 
which gives truth conditions of the object language sentences, such terms 
acquire * as their reference. For the object language we have only one 
domain, the actual domain. But in the metalanguage we have two domains, 
actual and outside domain containing *. V.’e have to start trying to talk 
sense about *. Does * exist or not? Can Scott really have it both ways? 
It is not at all obvious that Scott's system meets the intuitive require­
ment upon an adequate theory of truth for a natural language: that the
metalanguage and the object language draw on the same concepts.
In the next chapter we shall examine Grandy's proposal which 
is explicitly intended to meet this last requirement (which Grandy 
accepts) and is intended as an improvement on Scott's theory.
63
CHAPTER IX
REJECTION OF TRUTH VALUE GAPS AND RETENTION OF T^pd = -p 
(Continued) : GRANDY»S THEORY IN "A DEFINITION OF
TRUTH FOR THEORIES WITH INTENSIONAL DEFINITE DESCRIPTION
OPERATORS
Grandy's aim is closer to our purpose than the previous theories 
of Frege and Scott: to give a theory of truth which meets the requirements
of Tarski and Davidson, for a natural language containing primitive non- 
denoting singular terms. The theories of Frege and Scott were chiefly 
concerned with formal languages. Grandy distinguishes, as we do, the 
singular terras in myth and fiction from those in serious discourse.
He points out that the serious motivation for extending logic to include 
non-denoting singular terms is that "in everyday talk we use singular 
terms which we believe but do not know, denote; it seems desirable to 
have a logic which acknowledges this fact, and it seems plausible that 
a theory of truth can be formulated which expresses this fact."^^^^
Grandy's theory is formulated with what he calls an intensional 
definite description operator as an integral part. Vie shall not be 
concerned with the special properties of definite descriptions but 
with empty singular terms in general. Grandy states three objectives 
for the theory^^^). First, a coherent semantics for a non-extensional 
definite description operator. By a non-extensional definite description 
operator Grandy means one such that the formula (x) (Ax<J->Bx) <jxAx=7xBx 
is not valid. This is one of the main differences between Scott’s system 
and Grandy’s. If we recall, Scott considers the preservation of this 
formula, which is a principle of extensionality, to be one of the 
advantages of his system. One of the reasons for insisting that all
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improper descriptions assume the same improper value is to preserve 
this law. As we shall see, Grandy regards this account to be formally 
coherent but unnatural for ordinary discourse and takes a different 
approach to prevent sentences such as "the present king of France = 
the present queen of France" being true.
The second objective is that for any singular term t, t=t
should be valid. The axiom s=s and the schema s = t A s ~ } >  At are valid 
(71)for all terms . Grandy's justification for including the usual 
identity theory for all singular terms is that identity statements are, 
he says, the clearest examples of sentences containing empty terms 
being true.
The third objective is that we should give a definition of 
truth for the language in a metalanguage with the same logical apparatus. 
We require the theory of truth which is of the kind well exemplified 
by homophonie theories. We shall not be concerned here with the first 
objective. The second objective is unproblematic. It was met by. Frege's 
account and Scott's. The third was not met by either. We shall expound 
Grandy's system in some detail to see whether it is natural and whether 
it meets the third objective.
The logic used in Grandy's system is most similar to that of
Scott's. It resembles free logics in general in that inference from
(x) Ax to At or from At to (3 x) Ax is permitted only with the
additional premise that ( 3 x)(x=t). But it is not a universally free
logic, as Scott's is, because the domain of individuals is assumed to be 
( 72)non-empty • Singular terms are permitted to be at least potentially 
denotationless in the sense that they may have no denotation in the 
range of values of the variables, i.e. we cannot infer (3x)(x=t) from 
t=t.
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The semantics for Grandy’s system is an extension of Scott.
The first step is to permit an arbitrary non-empty set of objects 
(disjoint from the domain of individuals), D*, to function as a
(73)
pseudo-domain for the non-denoting singular terms to pseudo-denote . 
In effect, instead of * as the denotation cf all empty singular terms
we have * ^ ................ as denotations of t^.........t^ . D* need
not be finite. The second step is to permit the assignment of pseudo- 
denotation to a description to depend on what objects in the pseudo­
domain satisfy the formula to which the description operator is applied. 
The theory treats the description operator as having a broader range of 
values for the variables it binds than the quantifiers. But, as we 
shall see, the actual formulation of the model theory leaves this point 
unclear,
Vi/e shall rot attempt a complete exposition of Grandy’s particular 
formulation of the theory but focus on the most relevant aspects. Even 
this will involve us in criticism of certain technical details. 
Fortunately there is another theory, Burge's, which amends Grandy's in 
various ways and removes the defects we complain about. We shall come 
to Burge later.
Grandy states the syntax of a language L which is a metalanguage 
of a second language OB, then he gives the model theory for L, and the 
truth theory for OL, different from the model theory. In the syntax the 
notable features are as follows. Proper names are treated as
0 place function-words, atomic sentences are treated as 0 place 
predicates^^^Ine axioms and the rules are the standard ones with the 
exception of ( (v)(Av) A ( 3  v)(v=s) )->• As. The additional premise
(3 v)(v=s) in (Ar) reflects the fact that Grandy's system is based on 
free logic. A^ (3x)(x=x) is notable because it shows that Grandy’s 
system is not based on universally free logic.
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The model theory is considerably different from Scott in that
an interpretation of L is a quadruple , 7C^, where D & D* are
disjoint non-empty se^ts; /C is a function defined on all subsets of
D U D *  whose values are elements of D U D*, (x) ê D iff
x A D  = ^7l(x)}-j c}> is a function defined on all terms, wffs, predicate
letters and function symbols. Grandy has indicated that only the
description operator ranges over both D and D* '^^^  ^ ^
- o But the clause
for the universal quantifier as it is stated shows that we quantify
over D* as well: "(g) ^((v)A) = T iff for every interpretation
^ y> ,D,D* TCy such that Cp> and agree on all predicate and function
(77)
letters and all variables except possibly v, (A) = T" # If we 
added "and '4'(v) 6 D", then quantification would be restricted to the 
actual domain.
Let us see how Grandy*s model theory can be applied to evaluating 
the sentences of II. "Vulcan = Vulcan" would be true, for we have 
"( j) ÿ  (s=t) = T iff (^(s) =<^(t)" ^(Vulcan) would be, say, € D*
according to "(h^). For each f? (f?) 6 D U
"Vulcan is a planet" and "Vulcan disturbs the perihelion of 
Mercury" would be true. The relevant clauses are:
(On) For each p^, n>o, ^(p^) S (D U D*)^
(d) For each atomic wff p^ (s^.....s^) , ^  (p^(s^.....s^))
= T iff C ÿ(s^).o... 0(s^)> e^(p^)
(On) allows the extensions of predicates to be in D and D*. (d) allows
the above sentences to be evaluated as true. The model theory Grandy 
states provides us with an evaluation procedure for sentences containing 
empty names. Thus the metalanguage L has been adequately characterized 
by the given model theory.
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Now we can see how the truth theory for the object language OL 
is framed in L. The relation between OL and L is characterized without 
the notion of translation. For each predicate or function letter in OL 
there is a corresponding predicate or a function letter in L. There is 
a one place predicate D in L whose intended interpretation is the domain 
of OL. L has the adequate resources to describe the syntax of OL. We 
assume a correspondence between the vocabulary of OL and a subvocabulary 
of L. Grandy formulates the definition of truth via the standard 
procedure of satisfaction of formulas by sequences of objects. The 
axioms T^ and T^ for assignment of values to singular terms require 
some explanation. In the model theory for L, it is explicitly stated 
that the values of singular terms can be in D or In the truth
definition it is not clear whether T^ assigns values.to empty names.
We can interpret it by comparing it with T_^  together with Grandy's
remark that the pseudo domain D* is not brought in the truth definition
it ■ 
(79)
and conclude that, empty names are not given values by T|^ . In T^  ^ is
clear that only proper definite descriptions are assigned values 
In order to define values of terms other than variables, we have an 
axiom for each function letter f^
T .((A)(s )...(s ). oC(f^(s. .. .s )) = f^X&C(s,)...4<Xs ))
3  — I —n  i n  — I —n
There is a parallel axiom for 7
T^.(oC)(y)(A)(2yA) = 7x(DA(3;^ ) (^ ^ ^  sat A) )
Why is Grandy so shifty about this? If in L the quantifiers 
range only over D, then the predicate "D" is superfluous - but he uses 
it in Tg and T^; anyhow, the quantifiers of L cannot range only over 
D unless D is closed under sequence formation. Besides, if one compares 
T^ with and footnote 11 , it looks as if we must be quantifying over 
DuD* ; otherwise T.^  would have to be
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(3<30(v ) ( 3 x ) = X & Dx)
at least. He is too sket-cliy about what his sequences are sequences of, 
i.e. things in D or in DuD*^^'\
There are further difficulties with and Tj^ . Burge has shown 
that these axiom schemas have untrue i n s t a n c e s " F o r  example they 
yield the sentences:
(9) What any sequence <?<-assigns to ’the successor 
of the moon' is identical with the successor, 
of what oC assigns to 'the Moon'."
(9) is untrue because there is no successor of what every sequence’ 
assigns to "the Moon" and there is no assignment by oC to "the successor 
of the moon".
Another objection stated by Burge is that Grandy's system is not 
successful in avoiding implausible iuAentity statements which Grandy 
proposed to eliminate. As in Scott's system, sentences such as "the 
present king of France is identical with the only unicorn on the moon" 
can be proved in Grandy's theory when we add an axiom "(x)(Present King 
of France ( x ) ^  Unicorn on the Moon (x) )".
We shall conclude with some general remarks regarding the kind
of approach taken by Grandy.
Grandy anticipates the objection that the pseudo domain and the
pseudo objects invoke possible worlds and possible objects o Grandy's
defense is that the pseudo-domain is respectable in the model theoretic 
context and does not enter the truth definition. But how is Grandy 
going to show that anything which follows from a set of true sentences 
is true in L, unless he mixes up model theory and truth definition?
And in just the way he does not want to.
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Grandy’s assumption underlying his project, that if we do not 
mention the domain of non-entities in the language in which the truth 
definition is given, we are not committed to these entities, seems 
questionable. Grandy states that the matters of ontolog;/ and
intensionality can be better explained after the model theory and truth
theory have been given for then it is easier to argue that the pseudo­
domain is respectable in the model theoretic context and does not enter 
the truth definition^^^^. This does not sound right. We do not need to 
go to the model theory and truth theory to Imow our ontological 
committments. .We know it at the level of object language when we
introduce the singular terms as referring to objects Grandy states that
although the model theory requires a domain D* of non-entities, these 
entities are unreal "only from the point of view of the object 
language"^^^^* In giving the theory of truth, "the dubious domain (of 
non-entities) vanishes entirely for no mention of it was made..."^^^^.
But how can the pseudo domain, once introduced by Grandy, vanish? In 
the metalanguage when we take the singular terms of the object language
as part of it, the denotations of the singular terms are still with us,
and so is the domain D* which consists of the denotations of some singular 
terms. Of course, in the metalanguage, the denotations of the names of 
the object language singular terms are the singular terms and not the 
objects denoted by these terms. But in giving the theory of truth which 
is to give the truth conditions of, e.g. "The king of France is bald", 
we are concerned with objects and not expressions such as "the king of
France", So whatever object, real or unreal, we are committed to at
the object language level, we are equally committed to at the metalanguage 
level, for to give a truth definition we have to talk about the denotation 
of the expressions and not just about the expressions.
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We conclude that in spite of the initial promise of Grandy's 
theory, his objectives cannot be achieved without substantial modification 
of his theory. In fact, Tyler Burge has proposed a method of securing 
a great deal of what Grandy wanted and we shall come to Edge's theory 
in due course. But before the reader loses the thread of the argument, 
he may prefer to see the advantages and disadvantages of truth value gap 
theories. They may seem to have much more promise.
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CHAPTER X
GAP THEORIES : LAMBERT AND van FRAAS3EN
There are reasons having to do with semantical paradoxes and 
the diffieri ties of "universal languages" to think that there may 
always have to be sentences to which we cannot give a settled truth 
value. These considerations might affect the problem of definite 
descriptions. Definite descriptions are what we use to try to designate 
paradoxical entities in e.g. set theory. The connexion of these problems 
with the problem of vacuous names is much less direct. Names after all 
are finite in number (at a stretch, denumerably infinite perhaps).
Each is connected, or is purported to be connected, with a designatura, 
and connected so by some convention which gives meanings to these signs.
It is not like that with definite descriptions in particular. It does 
not hold that for each definite designation there is a separate convention. 
Their functioning depends on the semantic properties of their parts. It 
is this which makes them useful in the constructions which bring us at 
the limit to paradox.
It follows that there should be self-sufficient reasons to 
postulate truth value gaps for sentences with empty names. All writers 
on the subject that I know of who have wanted gappy evaluation have 
thought there were self-sufficient reasons. On the other hand, as we 
shall see in Chapter XI, systems with gaps invented to deal with 
paradoxes do appear to provide a possible framework for empty reference.
"Gappy" evaluation procedures for sentences involving empty 
names fall into the second class in the Dummett classification. We 
begin with gap theories which abandon the equivalence T *p’^ = p,- in
particular van Fraassen’s theory in "Singular terms, truth value gaps
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and free We shall make the. transition to this, however,
via the no-gap theory in Lambert and van Fraassen's Derivation and 
Count ere xar. nle, which they claim to be readily adaptable to van 
Fraassen's "supervaluation" approach for gappy evaluation.
In Derivation and Counterexample Lambert and van Fraassen present 
a s2/seem of universally free logic as an extension of classical 
quantification theory with identity to include the empty domain. Before 
weplunge into the actual system, some general remarks about the value 
of universally free logic are called for. The justification for admit­
ting the empty domain is that "it is not a logical truth that there is 
something rather than nothing"^^, It would seem that as a matter of 
principle a system of logic should not have existential presuppositions 
about the domain or the language. "There are many areas of ordinary 
discourse in which non-referring terms occur and free logic is meant 
to be usable in the logical analysis of such discourse"^ ® Free
logic is intended to provide "principles of reasoning in situations 
where the objects of our discourse are either non-existent or have only 
putative existence. So it enables one to measure the worth of reasoning 
in fictional discourse as well as in discourse about, say the hypothetical 
entities of science"^^^^.This reinforces to some limited extent, though 
not in the terms I should have chosen, what I have already endorsed 
about the importance of free logic for empty reference.
Now we shall focus on the distinguishing characteristics of 
Lambert and van Fraassen's system, "IntElim (*=)" in Derivation and 
C o u n t e r e x a m n l All singular terms are to be regarded as having 
no existential import. Neither Fa h (Ex)(x=a), then, nor Faf"(Ex)(Fx) 
are valid. Lambert and van Fraassen argue that if all singular terms
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were treated as having existential import - with the result that a 
simple statement containing a singular term could not be true unless 
that term really referred to something, then "a great number of common 
English statements could not be accommodated"# According to Lambert 
and van Fraassen, there are true sentences which appear not to entail 
any existence claim. "Zeus is not identical with Allah", "The ancient 
Greeks worshipped Zeus" are given as examples of such sentences.
Whether these are good reasons for extending standard quantific­
ation theory depends on how seriously we regard discourse about non­
existent entities* But an attempt to give a non-reductive account of 
such discourse cannot be without some direct or indirect value.
The statement of the rules of universal and existential 
generalization and instantiation differ from those of Scott and Smiley^ 
Van Fraassen and Lambert proceed by restricting the operations of the 
usual rules to formulas that do not contain individual constants. The 
formulas to which the rules apply never therefore contain empty referring 
terms. For instance, from (x)Fx we can infer Fx or Fy but not Ft, "t" 
being a metalogical variable for variables and constants. It is the case 
where "t" is a constant that invalidates (x)FxhFt. A free variable 
is treated as a name which refers to an existent. A bound variable 
ranges only over the domain. The values of free and bound variables 
are taken from the domain. This treatment of free variables differs 
from Scott's system in which the values of free variables were allowed 
to be outside the domain. One advantage of this is that, as Lambert 
and van Fraassen note, IntElim (*=) extended to include singular terms . 
does not differ in its account of logical truth with respect to 
statements containing only variables.
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Formulas involving quantifiers that are valid in the standard 
systems are valid in IntElim (*=) when additional existential statements 
are supplied. In the standard systems (x)A (t/x)A, A (Ex)(x/t)A 
are valid* In IntElim (*=), they need to be supplemented by 
(Ex)(x=t) : (x)A (Ex)((x=t) 3(t/x)A) and A(t/x).^((Ex)(x=t):> (ExOA).^^')
The rules of identity are extended to the entire class of 
singular terms. "In the case of non-referring terms correct usage of 
identity ascription cannot be decided by appealing to the sameness of 
reference. So we choose to accept the principles of self-identity and 
substitutivity of identity to govern correct usage t h e r e " . T h e  rules 
are:(93)
I I  : t=t
I.E : t^=t2) A k (t^/t^) A.
Given these rules, sentences such as "Pegasus = Pegasus", and "the 
golden mountain = the golden mountain", are provable. But Lambert and 
van Fraassen observe that it is not prima facie inconsistent to say 
that Pegasus is not Pegasus* The rules of identity need not be extended 
to all singular terms, although they can be extended without any logical 
difficulties. t=t is not a logical truth, "That 'Cicero = Cicero' is 
true, is no doubt indisputable since the person referred to by 'Cicero' 
must be exactly the person referred to by 'Cicero', namely Cicero. But 
this only establishes that 'Cicero = Cicero' is true, not that it is
logically true"/^^^ It might seem right to accept "y=y" as being true
of any replacement of "y" by any singular term. As Hailperin and 
Leblanc write, "We feel indeed that a statement of the form w=z is true 
if and only if z designates whatever w designates. But w designates 
whatever w designates, whether or not v/ designates anything. Hence
■ (94)
=w should.be true whether or not w designates anything»"w
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Here we want to raise an objection. This view about identity 
is difficult to defend. It seems to accept the pre-"On Sense and 
Reference" view of identity as a relation between names or signs.
If identity is a relation between objects, as it must be, how can 
"Vulcan = Vulcan" be true given that the sentence does not mention any 
objects that have the relation of identity? The inclination to regard 
such sentences as true seems to arise out of treating identity as a 
relation between signs and not objects. As Frege has exposed, such a 
view cannot be defended^^^^.
Lambert and van Fraassen's "metatheory of free logic" utilizes 
the notion of truth in a model to give a theory of truth for a language 
containing non-referring singular terms. To begin with, we have a 
model M, which can be taken as a possible world (in a non-commital 
sense, to be explained later) and the domain of M, which is a set of 
inhabitants - things which exist in "How can we find out
whether 'Pegasus flies' is true in M if 'Pegasus' does not designate 
anything in M? The answer to this question is; we can not find out. 
Since Pegasus does not exist, there are no facts to be discovered about 
him".^^^^ Lambert and van Fraassen point out that we can.arbitrarily 
assign such sentences a truth value. We have considered this approach 
as it was taken by Frege and found it inadequate. The approach Lambert 
and van Fraassen talce is Fregean in spirit.
We can say that due to its occurrence in 
some story (say in Greek mythology) the name 
'Pegasus' has acquired a certain connotation. 
Due to this connotation we may feel that 
'Pegasus swims' is false and 'Pegasus flies' is 
true. To get all the true sentences in the 
language, then, we need as part of a model M 
also a story. This story has to be consistent 
with the facts in M, of course; if M is the 
real world, the story may say that Pegasus 
flies but not that Pegasus exists nor that 
Pegasus is identical with some real horse.197)
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A model M consists of a domain D (a set empty or non-empty), 
an interpretation function f, and a story S. The function f assigns 
to each, predicate P a relation f(P) among the elements of D , and each 
element of D to one or more constants* (It is assumed that each thing 
in D is denoted by seme constant.) The story S is a set (empty or non­
empty) of atomic sentences, each of which contains some constant to 
which f has assigned no element of Then the definition of the
sentences and the usual connectives are as follows. "M t^ A" stands foi- 
"the value of A in M is T".
(a) Ml= Pa. ... a iff either Pa, ... a is in S or
1 n 1 n
^f(a^ ... a^)> 6f(P).
(b) M M A  iff not (M MA).
(c) Mf=^ (A§cB) iff Mf=A and M (=B.
(d) MI=^(Av'B) iff M ^ A  or MHB.
(e) M M (x)A iff M&(b/x)A for every constant b to
which f has assigned an element of D.
Every statement has a truth value in a model. We shall be 
only concerned with the clause (a). It seems that (a) is not adequate 
in specifying just which sentences of fiction are true in M.
"M# Pa,j ... a^ iff either Pa^ ... a^ is in S ..." would include any 
sentence of S to be true in M. Lambert and van Fraassen simply state 
that the sentences of S would have to be consistent with the facts in 
M. If (a) is to be an adequate definition, this idea has to be somehow 
incorporated into it. We cannot rely on what we "feel" is true because 
the story says certain things. Given just (a), we cannot say that 
'Pegasus exists' is false in M, if it is in S. Lambert and van 
Fraassen could say that "exists" is different from other predicates
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in that its extension is the whole domain, the objects in the domain; 
it can only be applied to singular terras which refer. But then we 
could say by the same token that the sentence "Pegasus flies" conflicts 
with the facts in M, for the extension of "fly" is a part of the actual 
domain and it applies only to singular terms that refer. In other words, 
if we are going to accept sentences such as "Pegasus flies" as true in 
M because the story says so, there is no reason not to accept whatever 
else is assorted in the story: "Once upon a time there was ..."
Regarding the truth status of identity statements in M, Lambert 
and van Fraassen offer the following explanation.
If b designates something then b=c is true 
exactly if c also designates that very same 
thing. But if b does not designate anything 
then b=c is true exactly if it belongs to the 
story of the model ...
(a) b=b is in S if and only if b is a 
constant that does not designate anything 
in the model.
(b) if b=c is in S and A (which contains c) 
is in S (and A ’, which contains b, is 
in S) then both (c/b)A and (b/x)A' are 
also in S.(99)
The obvious reaction to (a) is that b=b can be in S even when b designates 
something in the model. For instance, in the theory about Vulcan,
"Mercury = Mercury" is a true statement.
We conclude that Lambert and van Fraassen's metatheory of free 
logic does not give us an adequate theory of truth for languages containing 
nondesignating singular terms. This is not to deny that there is 
something right in their approach. Lambert and van Fraassen state 
that their development of free logic is motivated by what Russell 
called "the robust sense of r e a l i t y " ^ I t  is a virtue that the 
semantics for their system do not commit us to the realm of non-actual
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but possible beings. Tney stress that the "talk" about non-existents 
is just talk» For a model M, we can lisb 3^ ... the stories or
theories in addition to the actual domain.
But does this mean that the semantics are just talk about talk?
If it does, then the system is not really what it purports to be - an
evaluation procedure for extensional sentences containing empty names.
And the motivation for a].l the restrictions which Lambert and van 
Fraassen want to put on classical logic is not really sound. For classical 
logic ought then to be all right from this viewpoint provided only that
it is applied to sentences which do not have the overt oratio obliqua
understanding that they are to be read as saying "The story has it 
that ...".
But perhaps Lambert and van Fraassen do not want to say, what 
the above suggests, that there are no strictly true extensional sentences 
of the form "Fa" where "a" is empty. Rather they seem anxious to provide 
for the possibility that "Fa" could be true without a existing. That 
within the story "Fa" can hold without "a exists" holding outside the 
story seems to be something which impresses them. But the proper 
reaction to that is not a separate semantics for empty terms - after 
all saying that P in storytelling is speaking as if it had really been 
true that P - but an insistence that the storytelling mode is parasitic 
upon the ordinary mode of speakers and that at every point it simulates 
it. The right semantics on this view is the classical one. And the 
right approach to empty names is to say something extra about them after 
the normal semantics one completes. (We may well be driven to that 
approach ourselves in the end.)
One feels that these do not exhaust the possibilities for Lambert 
and van Fraassen. Perhaps another clue to their intentions is provided
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by the theory Lambert produced in collaboration vhLthMeyer^^^^^ Meyer and 
Lambert's system, FQ, seems to be a natural extension of Lambert and van 
Fraassen's system* What we said above about the connotation of "Pegasus" 
due to its occurrence in a myth is expressed as "the nominal inter­
pretation" of "Pegasus" by Meyer and Lambert. By means of nominal 
interpretation, they define "nominal truth"* Briefly, Meyer and 
Lambert's approach can be summed up in this way: non-empty names are
given "real interpretation". They are assigned real objects in the 
actual domain. The sentences containing non-empty names are to be 
evaluated as "really true" or "really false". Empty names, on the other 
hand are assigned "nominal interpretations". Meyer and Lambert state:
Nominally it is evident that 'Pegasus is a horse'
is true, and sharply differs from the nominally
false 'Pegasus is a cow' ... 'Pegasus' is in the 
domain of, to coin a barbarism, horse-words.^^^^)
It is obvious, however, that "nominal interpretation" and "nominal truth" 
have to do with dictionary meanings of words and not with truth. It 
seems undesirable to speak of "real truth" and "real interpretation" 
and "nominal truth" and "nominal interpretation" in a semantical 
theory. Dictionaries give us meanings of words without involving nominal 
truth or interpretation. Saying something true involves more than just 
using words in a way which is saying something correct or acceptable.
One consequence of FQ is that the so-called analytic sentences such as
"All bachelors are unmarried", being nominally true, will belong to the
same class of sentences as "Pegasus is a horse", or "All unicorns have 
one horn". The most undesirable of all the consequences of FQ is that 
all false theories become nominally true theories.
The natural move at this point is to change direction and 
introduce truth value gaps and regard sentences with empty names as
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lacking a definite truth value. Van Fraassen himself has developed a 
theory with truth value gaps, a theory of "supervaluations"^^^^^. In 
Derivation and Counterexample, supervaluations are mentioned as a 
possible approach to the free logic described there.
Van Fraassen expounds the method of supervaluations in the
following way. In order to present an interpretation of language L,
we specify a domain of discourse D, a non-empty set of things and a
function f which assigns reference to terms and extensions to predicates.
f is a partial function: for some names t f(t) is defined and is a
member of the domain D and for some other names that function is not
( 104)
defined. For some predicate F of L f(F) is the extension of F .
There is an asymmetry here in that van Fraassen allows partial inter­
pretations for singular terms but not for predicates. In this respect 
Smiley's system which allows partial interpretations for both singular 
terms and predicates is more comprehensive.
The following table shows how supervaluations differ from 
classical valuations over a model (f ; D) when the language contains 
a predicate F, names a, b, and f(a) is defined and f(b) undefined.
There are exactly two classical valuations V^, V^* s is a supervaluation.
b ^2
s
Fa T T T
Fa F F F
Fb T F -
Fb F T -
Fb V~F b T T T
(x)Fx T ' T T
(x)Fx Z> Fb • T F -
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and differ only wifch respect to formulas with empty names. 
adopts the convention that formulas with empty names are true and their 
regulations are false* In the opposite holds. Valuation V^ is 
adopted by Scott and Grandy. And V^, as we shall see, is adopted by 
Burge. The supervaluation s, on the other hand, admits gaps and does 
not make arbitrary decisions with sentences containing empty names.
Let us illustrate how a supervaluation works with "Vulcan is
II II
a planet". According to the table, since f(Vulcan) is undefined, the 
sentence has no truth value. Nor does its negation, "Vulcan is not a 
planet" have a value. There is something natural about these rulings, 
perhaps. But then, in spite of the disjuncts being unevaluated, the
disjunction "Vulcan is a planet or Vulcan is not a planet" is evaluated
by the method of supervaluation, and evaluated as true. Normally 
"Fb V  - Fb" is true if at least one component is true. With super­
valuation this is not so.
As we shall see in the section on Kripke’s theory of truth, 
this is not the only way of handling a gappy evaluation procedure; 
and we can maintain the classical interpretation of "v" in another 
way from van Fraassen. Once one has seen this, one finds it even more 
difficult to see how "Fb v - Fb" could be true even when both "Fb" and 
Fb" lacked a truth value. It violates our intuitions about dis­
junction that it could be true otherwise than in virtue of the truth 
of a disjunct. Surely "Fb v - Fb" should also lack a truth value.
(As it does in Kripke’s theory which uses Kleene's strong three-valued 
tables.) We shall return to this matter when we assess van Fraassen's 
distinction between the law of excluded middle and the principle of 
bivalence.
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Van Fraassen's attitude to the law of excluded middle is 
obviously connected with a doctrine which he and Lambert refer to in 
Derivation and Counterexample^ a s  "the venerable doctrine that 
the familiar truths of logic alone have no factual content". But 
what is so venerable about it? Certainly, if being devoid of factual 
content were their claim to being distinguished from other sentences, 
they should not differ very interestingly from "All raimsy were the 
borogrores and the mome raths outgrabe". Would it be all right to 
throw this, too, into the class of logical truth? It would do no harm - 
on van Fraassen's view. Logical truth is logical truth. So logical 
truths are truths. That the facts about the world do not invalidate 
them does not indicate that they are devoid of factual context.
(What does that mean anyway?) Rather they agree with the world 
however it is.The reason surely why nothing can invalidate them is that 
they are logical truths. If they lacked factual content, how could 
they be applicable to the discourse about the world, or guide our 
discourse about the actual world? "True" means the same in a deduction 
whether applied to contingent or necessary premises. It is not a 
homonym.
It is strange, too, that the authors overlook the fact that 
the assignment of truth values in Derivation and Counterexample 
actually conflicts with the method of supervaluations which they 
refer as a possible treatment of their system. In Derivation and 
Counterexample, "Pegasus is a horse" is evaluated as true because of 
the myth about Pegasus. In supervaluations since "Pegasus" does not 
denote, the sentence is neither true nor false. So Lambert and van 
Fraassen are not justified in claiming to be able to assimilate easily 
the supervaluation approach into the system in Derivation and 
Counterexample.
Van Fraassen states tha^ the imorshodoxj’ of interpretations 
with truth value gaps is mainly cne of semantics. The reason why he 
says this is that the method of supervaluations forces one into 
making a distinction between ohe law of excluded middle and the law 
of bivalence. The "logical law of excluded middle" says that the 
sentence of the form P v - P is true, 'une semantic law of bivalence" 
says that every proposition is either true or false, i.e. that one of 
P and - P is true and the other is false. In classical contexts the 
distinction between excluded middle and bivalence is without very much 
importance. T ( ^  v - P^  ) = P v - P .  But according to van Fraassen
the admission of true value gaps gives it content* M ^(P v - P) is 
valid for all interpretations M, but it is not the case that for all 
M, either M ^ P  or M F -  P.
There is a conflict between this distinction of excluded middle 
and bivalence and the principle T^P^ = ?, which van Fraassen puts as
(20) P if and only if it is true that P.
Van Fraassen says that he accepts (20) as plausible. Clearly the 
acceptance of (20), which is not different from Tarski's schema
E Pî should lead to accepting the equivalence of excluded middle 
and bivalence. For given
T^ 'p'* = p
and
P v - P
we have
T ^ p  V - p)*^
But van Fraassen attempts to avoid this result by rephrasing (20) as
(22) P; hence: It is true that P. It is true that P; 
hence: p/^^?)
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Then van Fraassen argues that we have as consequence of (22)
a* P; hence: It is true that P
h* not - P; hence: It is true that not - P.
From a* and b* the most we can deduce is
d. It is true that P or it is true that
not - P.
if we are given not
c . P or not - P
but only
c* Either P is true or not - P is true.
(The latter is not excluded middle but bivalence.) So van Fraassen 
concludes that (20) when reinterpreted as (22) does not lead to 
bivalence following from excluded middle.
There areiwo things wrong with this. First of all it violates 
the deduction theorem, A h B  ~>|-A“?B. Second, even if the rejection 
of the deduction theorem could be justified in some way, van Fraassen's 
way of establishing the compatibility between "(20) P if and only if 
it is true that P" and the distinction between excluded middle and 
bivalence seems to involve circularity. It appears that in order to 
maintain the distinction already introduced, van Fraassen assumes 
the compatibility between (20) and the distinction. Van Fraassen 
suggests that what he regards as only an apparent conflict between (20) 
and the distinction shows that we should reformulate (20) to avoid 
the conflict. Van Fraassen's suggestion that (20) should be 
rephrased as
83
(23) It is true tnat P if and only if it is true 
that (ib is true that P)
if we wished to use a biconditional, seems to give us all instances 
of the schema
True s = True "True (s)", 
which is what van Fraassen elsewhere calls "concessitation" and not 
T fp"* = p
which is clearly (20), The new principle scarcely salvages that 
particular thing which we found plausible in (20).
We conclude that if we have T*"pl = p, bivalence should 
follow from excluded middle. The effect of this by itself is not 
necessarily that we cannot distinguish bivalence from excluded middle, 
but that if we do distinguish then we must reject T*“p1 = p. We
should then need a new criterion of material adequacy for theories 
of truth.
A consequence of distinguishing excluded middle from bivalence 
is that we cannot give the usual truth condition for P v —  P, It is 
no longer the case that
ip v-^P* is true iff P is true ..or — P is true.
It is then unclear how we should give the truth condition.
The conflict between TTpi = p an.d the distinction of excluded 
middle and bivalence is not present in all systems with truth value 
gaps but is, so far as I know, unique to van Fraassen's formulation.
The way in which we can admit both T'p'» = p and truth value gaps is
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by regarding TTpi as truth valueless wlien p lacks a truth value. The 
view that compounds are assertions whose values are uniquely determined 
by the truth values of the components gives support to such an inter­
pretation. This leads me now to Xripke’s theory of truth in which 
both T Tpi = p and truth value gaps are admitted.
To motivate Kripkean theory of truth, viz. a theory of truth 
with gaps for languages containing their own truth predicates, we shall 
here bring into the argument Parson's argument against van Fraassen's 
theory of t r u t h . T h e r e  are two essentially different ways to a 
theory of truth here. If we follow Tarski, we have T^pl = p. That 
forces out the method of supervaluations. If we go against Tarski, 
however, we are not constrained by Tarski's restrictions or his 
hierarchy of languages to resolve the liar paradox. If we abolish the 
hierarchy of languages we cannot easily escape the obligation to try to 
approach a universal theory of truth. We shall see nothing wrong with 
the demand for a language that can state its ovm semantics or with a 
theory which applies to the very language in which the definition itself 
is given. But then it becomes doubly reasonable to demand that van 
Fraassen's theory of truth should apply to the metalanguage in which 
van Fraassen defines truth. (van Fraassen himself has an anti-Tarskian 
view of the semantic paradoxes.) Parson's argument shows that it 
cannot, and it questions the role of concessitation which van Fraassen 
accepted in place of T^p^ = p, in van Fraassen's theory of truth.
Given concessitation, Parson argues, the concept of truth which 
van Fraassen's semantics explains is not the concept of truth in natural 
language which we set out to investigate. "True in the object language" 
diverges in a way van Fraassen ought to find unacceptable from "true 
in the metalanguage".
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According to van Fraassen, the relation between A and T ^A"J
where ’T ’ expresses truth in the language, is concessitation; if A
is true, T^Alis true and vice v e r s a . P a r s o n s  remarks that this
concessitation fails when we consider the liar paradox. Van Fraassen’s
truth theory says of the liar sentence that it is neither true nor
false* This conflicts with concessitation. Parsons argues that given
concessitation, it would be natural to say that when A is not true,
T^A^should be false. But when A is the liar sentence this does not
work: when A is not true, T^A^ is not false but neither true nor false.
The conclusion is that ’T ’ fails to express the concept of truth as
it is used in the metalanguage. Parsons states that from the point
of view of truth theories which attempt to give definitions of truth.
for languages containing their own truth predicates, eg. natural
languages, van Fraassen’s system has a serious flaw: T ’ of the
object language and the phrase 'not true' of the metalanguage diverge 
(110)
in sense. We have a sentence A such that (it is true to say in
the metalanguage that) it is not true, but T OP the sentence that is 
supposed to say in the object language that A is true is not false, 
and - T ^ A^  is not true. This result goes against the idea that for a 
natural language there is no difference between what one can say in 
the language and what one can say about the language from outside.
Van Fraassen's theory has not produced a satisfactory account 
of empty reference. In order to find another theory of empty reference 
which does what van Fraassen attempts to do, we shall first expound 
Kripke's new theory of truth which diverges from all the previous 
theories in the manner in which it challenges Tarskian theories of 
truth as unsuited for natural language.
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CHAPTER XI
DIGRESSION : KRIPKE’S THEORY OF TRUTH^^^^^
Kripke’s theory of truth differs fundamentally from Tarski's 
theory in giving a definition of truth for languages containing their 
O'Vn truth predicates. In Tarski's theory, a truth definition cannot 
be given for semantically universal languages. Tarski's theorem showed 
that we cannot define truth for a language containing its ov/n truth 
predicate without provoking the Liar Paradox. The point is that 
Tarski's account embodies his diagnosis of the Liar and, so viewed, his 
theory is like a major surgery for a hangnail* Kripke has found a- way 
to be much less drastic and that embodies another diagnosis of the Liar.
Kripke's point of departure is the acceptance of the fact that 
natural language contains its own truth predicate; a theory of truth 
for a natural language should account for this fact. Kripke's strategy 
is simple: Tarski's theorem applies only to languages without truth
(112)
value gaps • We can circumvent the paradox and also satisfy Tarski's 
criterion of material adequacy for a theory of truth, which amounts to 
the equivalence T^pl = p. For if we admit truth value gaps, then the 
paradox goes into the gap* We can say that natural language as a matter 
of fact has its ov/n truth predicate, and that this fact, together with 
Tarski's criterion which must be satisfied by all theories, force the 
paradox into the gap.
We want to investigate whether Kripke's theory of truth provides 
a framework within which sentences with empty singular terms in 
extensional position can be evaluated. Kripke says that, with Strawson,
(113)
we can regard sentences v/ithout truth values as meaningful •
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The raeaningfulness or wellformedness of a 
sentence lies in the fact that there are 
specifiable circumstances under which it has 
determinate truth conditions (expresses a pro­
position), not that it always does express
a proposition.(1^4)
Kripke's remark is intended for paradoxical sentences. But 
the same can be said for other sentences without determinate truth
(113)value, as Strawson said concerning sentences with empty singular terms •
We have seen that the orthodox theory does not accommodate sentences 
with empty singular terms* But we have not challenged the theory's title 
to be the correct truth theory for natural language. To motivate Kripke's 
proposal, we shall enumerate Kripke's objections against the orthodox 
theory of truth.
The first objection is that Tarski's hierarchy of languages does 
not give us the accurate analysis of our intuitions concerning 'true'^^^^\ 
It is stipulated that to avoid the paradoxes a language cannot contain 
its ov/n truth predicate. We have a metalanguage which contains a 
truth predicate T^(x) for L^. The process can be iterated, leading to 
sequence (L^, L^,..*) of languages, each with a truth predicate
for tne preceding. It is said that our language contains just one 
predicate "true", not a sequence of distinct "true^" applying to 
sentences of higher and higher levels. A defender of the orthodox view 
might reply that the ordinary notion of truth is systematically 
ambiguous: the "level" in particular occurrence is determined by the
context of utterance and the intentions of the speaker. We use implicit 
subscripts. Kripke rightly points out that this picture is unfaithful 
to the facts. If someone utters (4 ) he does not attach a subscript 
implicit or explicit to his utterance of "false” which determines the 
level of language on which he speaks. Furthermore, ordinarily a
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speaker has no way of knowing the levels of Nixon's relevant utterances 
for (4). Kripke's verdict is that the level of sentences such as
(4) All of Nixon's utterances about Watergate 
are false
does not depend on the form alone (as would be the case If "false"
were assigned explicit subscripts), nor should it be determined in
advance by the speaker, but rather its level should depend on the
empirical facts about what Nixon has uttered, A statement should be
allowed to seek its ovm level high enough to say whau it intends to
say. It should not have an intrinsic level fixed in advance as in the
Tarski hierarchy. Notice that Kripke does nto dismiss the levels
altoghether but advocates a different approach to how the levels are
to be assigned to sentences. This is an important point which we shall
take up in the analysis of Kripke's own proposal. The second objection
is that sentences of the same level can judge each other but within the
confines of the orthodox approach, if two sentences are on the same
level, neither can talk about the truth or falsity of the other; the
(117)
higher can talk about the lower but not conversely • Suppose that 
Dean asserts (4), while Nixon in turn asserts
(3) Everything Dean says about Watergate is false.
We can assign unambiguous truth values to (4) and (3)*
The last objection is that the orthodox approach is not usually 
stated with an account of transfinite levels^^^^^* There is no. difficulty 
in the orthodox approach with asserting (6) Snow is white, and asserting 
that (6) is true and that "(5) is true" is true, etc.: the various
occurrences of "is true" are assigned increasing subscripts. It is
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problematic to assert that all the sentences in the sequence are true.
To do this, we need a metalanguage of transfinite level, above all the 
languages of finite levels. Kripke states that the problem of defining 
the languages of transfinite levels presents substantial technical 
difficulties and implausibilities.
Kripke’s objections are meant to establish that Tarski's theory 
does not capture the notion of truth in natural language. But it seems 
that there is no objective way of deciding which is the best theory. 
Comparing the general strategies taken by two theories we could say the 
following: Tarski's approach revises the syntax of the language to
prevent the liar paradox from being asserted. Kripke's approach revises
the semantics to circumvent the liar paradox; it can be asserted but is 
outside of all possible extension of the truth predicate. Truth is now 
a partial predicate. It might be said that Tarski's approach is 
preferable: it might be said that it is better to revise the rules of
syntax, which are not sacrosanct. The notion of truth cannot be mended 
without altering our basic intuitions. What this comparison reveals is 
that there is no ultimate criterion for deciding in favour of one theory 
rather than the other*. However, we shall explore the usefulness of
Kripke's theory for our purposes.
First, how do Kripke's objections against the Tarskian theory 
affect Davidson's proposal? If we look at the criteria of acceptability 
for a theory of truth and meaning formulated by Davidson, we can see 
that they are independent of the features of Tarskian theory that are 
considered by Kripke to be unsuited to natural language. The criteria 
could be equally well formulated within Kripke's theory. So Davidson's 
strategy of giving meaning via truth conditions can still be accepted.
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Since Kripke's theory involves complexities qhak are not 
directly connected with our project, v/e shall not attempt to give a full 
explanation of the theory, but adapt it to a language containing empty
(119)
terms , filling out the details using Kleene's strong three valued
logic^^^^^ which Kripke uses to illustrate the theory.
Kripke's proposal agrees with most of the alternatives to the 
orthodox approach on a single basic idea;
there is to be only one truth predicate, 
applicable to sentences containing the 
predicate itself; but paradox is to be 
avoided by allowing truth value gaps and 
by declaring that paradoxical sentences 
in particular suffer from such a gap.(L2l)
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CHAPTER XII
GAP THEORIES (Continued) NATURAL IMPLEMENTATION 
OF KRIPKE'S THEORY OE TRUTH APPLIED TO PROBLEMS 
OF EMPTY REFERENCE
A. MOTIVATION
Sentences with empty names in extensional position can be 
divided into three categories. We shall first list them and then 
state the underlying intujlions which suggest these verdicts.
(1) False: The sentences with empty names and non-empty
names connected by predicates. Examples: ’’Leverrier 
discovered Vulcan". "Vulcan disturbs the perihelion 
of Mercury". "Aguirre found El Dorado".
(2) True: The negations of the sentences in (1).
Examples: "Leverrier did not discover Vulcan",
"Vulcan does not disturb the perihelion of Mercury".
"Aguirre did not discover El Dorado."
•(3) Undefined: The sentences with only empty names
and extensional predicates (exception: "exist").
Examples: "Vulcan = Vulcan". "Vulcan is a planet".
Exception: "Vulcan exists" which is clearly false.
The justifications for the above division are as follows. To 
say something true or false, we have to say something about the world 
and the entities in it, Extensional relations can only hold among 
actual objects. When we attempt to connect an empty name and a non­
empty name by an extensional predicate, we say something false about
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the reference of the non-empty name: that it stands in such and such
a relation with another entity. That assertion has to be false if there 
is no entity for it to bear the required relation. So we consider 
sentences such as
Leverrier discovered Vulcan
to be false and their negations to be true.
As for the sentences containing only empty names, how can they 
be true or false when there is nothing in the world for them to be true 
or false about? This is very different from saying that such sentences 
are meaningless.
Vulcan = Vulcan 
Vulcan is a planet
are undefined, because given that "Vulcan" lacks reference, vie cannot
assign the value T or F to them. We follow Frege's reasoning here: it
is of the reference of a name that a predicate is affirmed or denied,
(122)
If a name lacks a reference, we cannot affirm or deny the predicate.
We cannot say of sentences which contain only empty names that they are 
true or false. It seems plausible to hold that using only empty names 
we cannot say anything true or false (about the world) but using empty 
names in combination with non-empty names we caii. We shall propose a 
theory which attempts to capture these intuitions.
B. PRESENT PROPOSAL
Language L is based on free first order quantification theory 
with standard logical operations, =$ individual constants, a, b, c 
predicate constants, P, Q, R, individual variables x, y , z, x^, y^,
..., and the definite description operator 7 , (To lighten the
95
load of formal exposition firoction signs f, g, h ... will be thought 
of as defined, each of them by an axiom using * ? * in the obvious way,)
L contains empty singular terms and predicates with partial extension.
A, B, C, are variables ranging over wffs of L, t, t^ ... t^ over terms 
of L,
Since the truth theory is Kripkean, L may perfectly well contain 
its OUT! truth preiicate. Our eventual criticism of the proposal will 
depend on whether the statement of L's semantics can be turned back on 
itself. We shall find that it cannot. Not only that, the theory 
depends on the same devices behaving differently within the language 
being described and the language in which vie are doing the describing. 
Enough has been said about the motivation for Kripke's theory to make 
clear how damaging a criticism this is. But it is worth emphasizing 
that the same argument would undermine the proposal even if v/e made 
(for Kripkean purposes) an otiose distinction between object and 
meta].anguage. For Davidson's more modest requirements on language 
description ane violated also* The same linguistic device cannot 
behave in different ways* We are talking about English in English,
The axioms and rules underlying L are as follows.
If A is a tautology, ' h A.
A^ (x)(A-^B) -->((x)A-^ (x)B)
A^ (X)(x=x)
A^ (x)A &(-3 y) (y=t) -7 A(x/t)
Ag (x)(x= 7 yAy ^ (z)(Az -> z=x))
A^ (x)(3y)(x=y)
Ag (x)(x=t^<-^ x^t^) (A(z/t^)<-> A{z/t^)) where x
is not free in t. or t_
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At^ ... (3 ... &(3 y^ )(?%=%%)
where A is any predicate, including identity,
8c where y^ is not free in t^.
^10 (3y)(y=f(t^ ..o t^)) -t (3 y^)(y^=t^)8c ... &
(3y%)(y%=t^) where y is not free in t^ ... t^,
& y^ is not free in t^.
If f- A and {-A then H B
1^ 2 If f- A “^ B  then |— A (x )(B) where x is not
free in A.
We turn now to the theory of truth in L. The domain of 
discourse D is n o n - e m p t y , a n d  consists of actual objects, s, -s' ... 
are sequences of objects from the domain. Given a sequence s, s* is 
an interpretation function for all terms and predicates of L. Since
L contains empty singular terras, s* is a particular function; for
some arguments s*( ) has no value. s*(x_) = i-th member of s. (The 
overlying device here is a quotation device*) s*(x_) is always defined 
since sequences consist of actual objects from the domain, and the 
variables x, y, z, , y^, z^ ... range over the domain. For each 
non-empty name n, we have an axiom of the form s*(n) = b* With each 
predicate letter of degree n we associate a domain D^(P^) an extension 
of the form S^(P^) = 'z (z is.Q & z S-D^(P^) where the expression figures 
in the place marked by "Q" on the right hand side translates the 
predicate P^. We also associate with each predicate letter an anti­
extension by an axiom of the form S^(P^) = z(z is not Q & zj=D^(P^)).^^^ ^
We can then assign to each predicate letter an interpretation 
by an axiom of the form
s*(P^^) = <s\p^), S~(P^)>.
V
is read "s' agrees with s in all assignments except that
X
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it assigns x to v"* "v" ranges over variables of L* s~ is the sequence
got by replacing the entity in the i-th place of s by the entity z.
IIa IIs = T is read "the value of A for the assignment is true" or "s satis­
fies A" or "the satisfaction value of A is truth". Note that the formula 
A here may be either open or closed. Similarly for I Alls = F where F is 
falsity. lIAlls = u means that the satisfaction value of A is undefined. 
(The problems that this stipulation involves will surface in due course.) 
The postulates of the theory of truth for L are as follows.
T1. (3 s)(v)(3 x)(s*(v)=x)
T2. (s) (v) (x) ( 3 s ' ) (s &  s')
T3»1, 3*2 ... A finite list of axioms one for each non- 
• 'empty name in the language and each of the form
s*(n) = b where b is the entity which n designates.
Where there is no entity designated by a name n, 
G*(n) is undefined.
T4.1
T4.2
t4o3
T3.
(s)(z) ( ( 3 w) ( 114^ xdls^ = T & w = z & (y)(ll^xh|s^ = T 
^ y  = w)) -i» z = s*( 7X 4&x^))
(s) ( ( 3  w) ((! xJ[ = T 8c (3 y) (II P X J1 s^ & y / w) 
s*(yx.<px.) = z{<pz))
If no sequence satisfies 9^x^ then s*( 7 x^^x^) is 
undefined
For each predicate letter of degree n there are 
axioms of the form (a), (b), (c) following.
(a) If P’^(t,
< s*(t
(b) II P^(t
< s*(t
(c) ||p"(t
s*(t
t^ )//s = T iff
, s*(tp;> £ sip")
t^)^s = F iff
tn)lfs = u iff
s*(tp;> ^  si?) u shp")
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To* i[ - Alls = T iff IIA Us = F
11 - Alls = F iff Il A Ils = T
11 - Alls = u iff 11A 1(3 = u
T7« 1 AvBlls = T iff llAits = T or IIB/ls = T
1 AvBlls = F iff WAgs - F and || Blls = F
II AvBlls = u othe rwise
t 8. 1 A ->Blls = T iff IIAils = F or 1 Blls = T
llA-^ BIls = F iff 1 Alls = T and IIHis = F
HA->Blis = u otherwise.
T9. 11 (v) Alls = T iff (x)(s')(s &  s' iI(v )a 1
fl (v)A|ls = F iff (3 S ' ) (x) (s &  s'-^  ll(v).
11 (v)A/ls = u otherwise.
Definition of truth is Tr (A) = if(s) ||A(ls = T.
This proposal modifies the standard system, just to the extent 
that it accommodates empty singular terms and admits truth value gaps.
We should note that To* and T7« conform with Kleene's tables for negation 
and disjunction. Negation is defined so as to preserve all instances of 
the schema T^p^ = p. And P is true (false) if P is false (true) and 
undefined if P is undefined. Although we have truth value gaps, in 
effect the classical interpretation for negation is nowhere violated: 
a sentence is false iff its negation is true. (We shall return to 
Kripke's reasons for retaining a version of T^ p"* e P iu due course.)
A disjunction is said to be.true if at least one disjunct is true 
regardless of whether the other disjunct is true or false or undefined. 
(This interpretation of disjunction differs therefore from van Fraassen's 
supervaluations.)
As Kripke states^^^^^, Kleene's strong three-valued logic does 
not require an essential modification of classical logic. It weakens 
the classical logic to the extent -hat HAv - A ll = u when j( A (| = u. But
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no extra trutn values beyond truth and falsity are involved. 'u' can 
be understood as 'undefined' or unkno'vu^^^^^. Kleene's tables are what 
we get if we interpret 'A is u' as 'it is not determined whether A is T 
or F'. 'u' can be thought of not as a truth value but as an 'epistemic 
value'. Kleene's explication of how 'u' functions is as follows*
The status of u is not on a par with the other 
two values: u means only the absence of
information that Q(x) is t or-is f. We ask to 
be able to decide by an algorithm given x whether 
Q(x) V R(x) is t or f (if it is defined) from 
information that Q(x) is t or is f (if it is 
defined) and like information about R(x)* 
Information that Q(x) is u is not utilisable by 
the algorithm* If in case Q(x) is u, the 
algorithm gives e.g., t as value to Q(x) V R(x) 
the decision to do so (for the given x, and.R(x)) 
must not have depended on information about Q(x) 
since none was available
Unknown is a category into which we can regard 
any proposition as falling, whose value we either 
do not know or choose for the moment to disregard; 
and it does not then exclude the other two 
•possibilities3 'true' and 'f a l s e ' . (^^o)
The way Kleene interprets "u" is as "it is unknown whether 
true or false". But if this is the only admissible interpretation 
of "u" there is some difficulty in assigning u to paradoxical sentences, 
as Kripke does in his theory of truth. For it is not the case the value 
of paradoxical sentences are "unknovm" or not yet determined. It is 
not as if they will sometime be determined, they are u at all fixed 
points, so everything that can be determined already is determined. 
There is a similar difficulty in Kleene's interpretation of "u" when 
assigning "u" to sentences with empty names which is what-we hope to 
do. When we say e.g. the value of "Vulcan is a planet" is u, we cannot 
mean that the value is as yet unkno’wn, or that it is not yet determined. 
What would we have to loiow to determine its value? We must mean that 
it definitely has no value T or F. In order to allow for sentences
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that definitely lack a truth value, we need to interpret "u" so as to 
cover "it is knovm that P is not true and P is not false", as well as 
covering "it is not known whether P is true or false", "u" will cover 
the disjunction of these, then.
Now we can apply the present proposal to some concrete examples, 
The truth value we want for
Leverrier did not discover Vulcan
is T. We shall work out the truth condition for this sentence trans­
lating it as —  (D, 1, v)o The clause for negation says that the 
negation is true iff the original sentence is false. So we have
11 - (D, 1, v)|[.s = T =11 CD, 1, v)||s = F
To evaluate the right-hand side, we need Tg.(h). But T^.(h) as it
stands does not tell us how to decide the value of " ^ ab" when "b" does 
not denote. One obvious amendment would be to add to T6.(b) the clause
or if <s*(t^) ... s*(t^) =A>€;S^(P^)
But then what we have is Frege's stipulation for empty singular terms, 
that they all denote /\, which we have rejected as being artificial for 
natural languages.
Another possible solution is to change T5»(b) and T5.(c) into
T5. (b)' f! P^(t^ ... t^)t(s = F if either
<s*(tp ... s*(t^)> c, or
if s*(t^) is defined and s*(t^) is 
undefined or s*(t^) is defined and 
s*(t^) is undefined
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(c)’ ... )lls = u if either
<s*(t^) ... £*(t^)> ^ s \ ? ) U s ~ ( ? )  or
<l5*(t^) ... 5*(t^)^are ail undefined.
Sojl 1, v)|)s = f cy Ty.Cb) since s*(l) is defined but s*(v) is undefined. 
This is in the spirit of parniai interpretation.
But now lock at the fern of T5.(c)' itself which, like T5-(b)', 
contains an empty term. According to our pretheoretic classification they 
fall under type 3, which means that the value is u. But surely the 
semantical theory’- itself has to be advanced as T, not as u.
Frege's solution faces the same predicament if we try to 
rephrase s*(t^) = A  to avoid -unnatural consequences that follow from it.
For instance, we might imagine we could read s*(Vulcan) = /\ not as 
Vulcan refers to the null class
but as
Vulcan does not refer to anything
Then the difficulty is that, this sentence, like all other sentences 
specifying the reference of empty terms, falls into the type 3 above, 
the sentences with the value u. But again the theory of truth must be 
committed to its c^n sentences being true. They are axioms of the
theory. If, on the other hand, we interpret s*(Vulcan) =/\ as " 'Vulcan* 
refers to/\" (as we are forced by what we have already accepted regarding 
s* and 'refer'), then the sentence says that Leverrier discovered the 
null set. He.didn't. (Perhaps Schroeder did.)
There is no immediate solution to this dilemma: axioms of
truth theory stipulating the reference of empty terms either come out 
u or, on the Fregean option, give completely wrong interpretations.
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We might try to avoid this result by insisting that the 
stipulations regarding sentences with empty names should not apply to 
the sentences of the truth theory. The logic of the truth theory itself, 
it might be said, is bivalent. But we cannot take this way out.
Since the language for which the theory of truth is given is
the same as the language in which the theory is stated - or could be -
it is an evasion of the obligations which bind any semantic theory to
have a group of stipulations applying to one part of the language 
(English) and not to another part (English again) which uses exactly 
the same expressive devices. (Cp. Davidson "Semantics of Natural 
Languages" op.cit.) The requirement that object language and meta­
language should not be mismatched is . violated if we allow the gap 
into the object language and not into the metalanguage. The language 
in which truth definition is given is bivalent if and only if the 
language itself is. Kripke comments that the logic of the language
stating the truth definition is bivalent. He says this without further 
, , .. (129)elaboration.
These difficulties do not seem to be accidental difficulties 
and they arise not at the limit of understanding (as the paradoxes do) 
but in connexion with what is central and elementary. Obviously we 
must go back to the other class of theories without truth value gaps.
The sole survivor was Burge.
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CHAPTER XIII
THEORIES WITHOUT TRUTH VALUE GAPS (Resumed) : BURGE'S 
"TRUTH AND SINGULAR TERMS"
Burge's theory, now the sole survivor, may be seen as arising 
out of the defeats he sees in Grandy's t h e o r y . T h e  differences are 
important particularly with regard to such identities as Zeus = Zeus or 
Jove - Vulcan (both of which Burge accounts false, on the ground that 
for truth the objective existence of the designate is required). But 
the similarities are more important than the dissimilarities.
Burge's theory is given in the form of a theory of truth for a 
language containing non-denoting singular terms accommodated expricitly 
as such. The theory is based on free first order quantification theory. 
If we have non-denoting singular terms in the language, then identity 
theory requires that we modify the operations of instantiation and 
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . F o r  given "(x)(x=x)", we derive "Pegasus =
Pegasus" by unrestricted universal instantiation. By unrestricted 
existential generalization we should then arrive at (3 y)(y = Pegasus) 
which is clearly false. It follows that we must either alter the 
identity theory or restrict the operations of instantiation and 
generalization. Changing the identity theory, we remark, might not 
be enough for if xRxipxRx is valid then existential generalization would 
make (3 y)(yRy :>yRy) valid, which, as Mostowski and Scott have pointed 
out, prevents the class of valid formulas being closed under modus
(132)ponens.
Burge's treatment of identity seems preferable to the previous 
accounts. In Burge's theory the laws of reflexivity and substitutivity
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are:(123)
(A3) H  (x)(x=x)
(a 4) |- ^»(A(x/t^)<y»A(x/t2))
Sentences such as "Pegasus = Pegasus" or "the present king of France =
the present king of France", are false in Burge's system. Burge's
reasons for advancing (A3) rather than the stronger axiom schema, t=t
adopted by, for instance, Grandy and van Fraassen, are that, while
self-identity is a property of objects and all objects have it, sentences
expressing identity are true or false only by virtue of the relation
that the identity predicate and singular terms bear to the world.
"Pegasus" bears no such relation. "Philosophical questions regarding
( 134)
identity seem bound to the notions of existence and object".
Burge treats sentences such as "Pegasus is an animal" as false, 
and treats "It is not the case that Pegasus is an animal" as true. All 
atomic sentences containing empty names are false for Burge. They 
cannot be true because basic predications (atomic predications enumer­
ated as such in the theory) have to be true, if at all, of objects.
When there are no such objects as are purported to be designated, then 
no predication of them can be true.^"*^^^ Burge makes room to regard 
the negation of an atomic sentence with an empty name or names as true 
rather then truth valueless because in his theory operations such as 
negation are seen as working on simpler sentences as wholes. Burge 
maintains that negation never serves to form complex comments upon or 
complex attributions to purported objects. Negation is treated as a 
sentential operator. Construed so, as a stoic operation on the whole, 
negation will form from any significant sentence which is not true a 
true sentence.
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This certainly does justice to our feeling that it is true that 
Leverrier did not find Vulcan,
The best way of showing how this much is achieved is to show 
the derivation within Burge's system of the T sentence
True (Leverrier discovered (Vulcan) iff 
Leverrier discovered Vulcan.
We are given as a definition of truth: (^) - df ( )( ^ satisfies A)".
So the sentence we need to prove is
s sat(D 1 v)^D 1 V
where "D 1 v" abbreviates "Leverrier discovered Vulcan".
( 1 ) s satCD 1 y)
(2) s*(I)= 1
Now by T.5: s sat Discovered (t,f) iff Discovered (s*(t), s*(t')). 
Therefore D(s*Cl% s*(v)). Therefore
(3) D(l, s*(v))
Now by Burge's T3*(a) (see page 317) we have
(4) (x)(x = Vulcan «->x = S*(Vulcan)
We now use (A.8) (x)(x=t xat^) A(y/t^^A(y/t^)) where x is
not free in t^ or t^, in order to detach on the basis of (4).
(5) A(y/Vulcan) = A(y/s*(Vulcan)). 
Take "D l(y)" as Ay, and we have
(6) D 1 V = D 1 s*(Vulcan).
So by (3) and modus ponens we have
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(7) D(1 v)
Therefore
(8) s sat(D 1 v)<->D 1 V.
So much for the virtues. The difficulty is that Burge admits that his 
account of negation is incomplete. (He alludes here to Grice's scope 
distinction for proper names.) Burge sees that it will be.difficult 
to prevent negation from operating on all open sentences whatsoever.
He remarks that the question is "tricky". It is indeed - if Burge's 
theory is not to lose its very distinctive feature.
Consider sentences such as
(x)(god X - (mortal x)).
Those sentences which essentially involve the operations of negation 
upon an. open sentence are inexpressible in the language . Burge describes 
This will impoverish its expressive resources. Second note that 
sometimes in natural language, it is not clear whether negation is 
implicitly present or not in certain predicates. For instance "single" 
and "not married" and "married" and "not single" appear to be equivalent 
predicate pairs. But if predicate negation is not allowed one cannot 
be explained in terms of the other by means of an equivalence 
( x ) ( M x  = -  S x ) .  A related point is that of the role of atomic predicates 
in Burge's theory. Burge's method of assigning truth values depends on 
being able to distinguish atomic predicates or sentences from others.
But there is some difficulty in distinguishing atomic predicates in 
natural language'and hence some difficulty in evaluating sentences in 
accordance with Burge's method.
107
The following example should illustrate the difficulty involved 
in assigning truth values in the way Burge states. Take "single" as a 
basic predicate. Then according to Burge
(1) Zeus is single 
is false and
(2) Zeus is not single
is therefore true. Now it seems clear that "single" and "married" are 
contraries: "single" is equivalent with "not married" and "not single"
is equivalent with "married". Employing these equivalences we get
(1)' Zeus is not married,
(l)' should be equivalent to (l). But on Burge's theory they have 
different truth values, since (1)' is a negation of something which 
should be false by Burge's theory. Similarly Burge's theory gives the 
value "false" to
(2)' Zeus is married.
But (2)' should be equivalent to (2), which, according to Burge, is true.
(1)' and (2)' violate Burge’s stipulation that atomic sentences with
empty names are false and their negations are true.
This is not all. Depending on which predicate is taken as
basic we would have to assign opposite truth values to the same sentences
(1) and (2), and (1)' and (2)' each has the opposite truth value depend­
ing, on whether "single" or "married" is taken as basic. For some 
predicates this amounts to making it an arbitrary matter whether 
certain natural language sentences are true or not. That is not a way 
of taking empty names seriously. We conclude that, since it is not
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always determinate which predicates are basic, we cannot apply to natural 
language Burge's method of assigning truth values which depends on 
distinguishing basic predications from other attributions.
There is a related worry which questions Burge's rationale of 
singling out atomic predicates. "Zeus = Zeus" is false according to 
Burge because it is required for its truth that a certain relation have 
in its extension an actual pair ^ Zeus, Zeus ^ • Now take "Zeus = Zeus 
Zeus = Zeus". This sentence is true for Burge because it can be
evaluated as F ->F. But using the standard A  conversion we can arrive
at the following from it:
(A x) (x=x -T” x=x) (Zeus) .
This sentence must be true. Since ' (pj = ( A^) ( T^x) (y) it is equivalent 
to the first sentence. But there is a difficulty in regarding the A  
version as true if we take Burge's explanations seriously. How can this 
property, (/\x)(x=x x=x) hold of Zeus if Zeus does not exist? This 
question simply copies Burge's o\m question about "Zeus = Zeus". So one
might say that either the A  version is not equivalent or Burge's dis-
thinction of atomic and non-atomic predicates betrays his motivation.
If there was reason to require existence for "Zeus = Zeus" then one 
might argue that there was a reason to require it for "Zeus = Zeus 
Zeus = Zeus".
Let us return to the problem of negation. Take the sentence
(3) Zeus is not a mortal person.
If we are given
(4) The class of gods is the same as the class 
of things which are not mortal
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and we translate (3) as
(5) Zeus £• y (not a mortal person y) 
then by intersubstitution we have
(6) Zeus E X (god x)
which has as its predicate translation, "Zeus is a god". But this is 
false according to Burge. So if we follow Burge's method of evaluation 
a true sentence (3) implies a false sentence.
Obviously Burge would say that the whole problem here depends 
on the placing of the "not" within the class abstract and reading (3) 
in a way tantamount to a predicate negation. But this is not enough. 
Something must be done about the gap in the Powers of expression in 
Burge's language.
Suppose now that Burge did attempt to make the distinction
between predicate negation and sentence negation. In order to maintain
his valuations within the extended system, Burge needs to distinguish
- ( (ÿa) or - ( ( A  z) ( ÿ z), (a) ) and (Neg( Az) ( ^  z) ) (a) . ^ Syntactically
we can distinguish these. We read "Socrates is not a god" in the first
way as the negation of zero place predicate "Socrates is a god".
(A  z)(Socrates is a god) is taken as the property that nothing has, for
"Socrates is a god" is false. "Socrates is not a god" is then seen as
"Not ( Az) (Socrates is a god) (A ) ” where the property which nothing has
is predicated of an arbitrary object, say the null set. Obviously then
we can give distinguishable semantics. But the two negations will still
have deductive relations.with one another. In the standard semantics
the negations of all properties, zero place, one-place are given
(137)a unitary account by this axiom
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(s) (s sat (Not( Ax^) (a ) ) (t) iff s-^^-^-y not sat (A).
Applying this axiom to "Zeus is not a mortal person", for the 
sentence negation we have.
s sat (Not (Ax^)(Zeus a Mortal person) )(/\) iff 
4
s—
s  ^ not sat (Zeus a mortal person).
Since no sequence satisfies "Zeus is a mortal person" s does not
s*(A)
satisfy it. So clearly the right hand side of the biconditional is true. 
By the obvious axiom "s sat not ^  = s not sat ^ ", the negation mentioned 
on the left hand side is also true.
So far everything is all right. Predicate negation is, however, 
problematic. We have
s sat (Not (Ax^) (Mortal person Xr))(Zeus) iff
4 _______________
6— Y=====rr not sat (Mortal person x, ). 
s*(Zeus) ^ 4
The right hand side of this biconditional is true on Burge's principles
q
for there is no sequence with Zeus in its fourth place, "s— r7= = v  "^ s*(Zeus)
therefore stands for nothing, by virtue of Burge's semantics for empty 
temrs. So the denial should be, for Burge, true. But Burge is in no 
position to allow "Zeus is not-mortal" to be true. Application of the 
predicate "not-mortal" to Zeus should be false according to Burge's view 
on the matter. It is no straightforward matter to alter the semantics 
for "not" as predicate and sentence negations. The point does not depend 
on our particular way of stating the connexion between the two negations. 
It corresponds only to the fact that given a sentence of the stoically 
negated form "not ÿ (a)", we can abstract upon the subject place to get 
the open sentence "not ^(x)" with a variable which can be bound from 
outside. So long as this is possible (and is needed to express what we
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need to express), the two negations cannot be deductively divorced. 
Nor can the particular linkages which the orthodox theory implies to 
be breached within any theory of truth which burge shows us how to 
conceive.
To show that, as matters still stand, the two negations are 
deductively linked, we only need to establish the general equivalence
(s)(s sat (Not(Ax^ Zeus is mortal), (a ))
= (s)(s sat (Not(Ax^(Mortal x^)), (Zeus))).
Here is a quick informal proof (a proof from left to right, but since 
only equivalences are used in the actual proof, it will work equally 
from right to left).
(1) s sat (Not(^\x^(Zeus is Mortal), (A ))
4
(2) s— not sat Zeus is Mortal 
s IA /
(using the axiom: (s)(s sat (Not Ax^A) (t) ) = s— not sat A).
(3) (s)(s sat Zeus is Mortal = s sat ( Ax^^(Mortal x^)(Zeus))
4
(4) (Ax^(Mortal x^), (Zeus))
4
(5) ^s*(A ') (Not ( Ax^(Mortal x^), (Zeus))
(using the axiom: s not sat ^ = s sat not^.)
(6) s sat (Not(/\x^(Mortal x^)), (Zeus))
(since the quoted sentence is closed.)
(7) s sat (Not(/\x^(Zeus is Mortal) (A))
s sat (Not(A x^(Mortal x^), (Zeus))
To summarize, Burge's treatment of negation requires that we be able to 
separate predicate negation from sentence negation. But some reformulation 
which he does not show us the way to invent for a language of ordinary 
expressive power is needed. I do not see how to achieve this reformul­
ation.
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Burge’s theory still has definite advantages. It assigns the 
right truth values to some sentences with empty names about which we 
have a reasonably clear intuition. Existential statements receive the 
correct evaluation "Pegasus exists" is evaluated as false and "Pegasus 
does not exist" as true. Another group of sentences, e-g. "Leverrier 
discovered Vulcan" and "Leverrier did not discover Vulcan" are given 
the right truth value, false and true.
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CHAPTER XIV
THE GENERAL DIFFICULTIES ABOUT EMPTY REFERENCE
Burge’s theory was the most hopeful, and it vindicates my 
statements about the separateness of the problems of fictional names 
like "Pegasus" and non-fictional names like Leverrier's "Vulcan". But 
the time has come to review the whole problem. Do we need to embark on 
the intricacies of sorting out negation in Burge's system?
We shall now attempt to summarize our conclusions and to arrive 
at some generalizations about the problems of empty reference. The 
matter is confusing because of the very diverse motivations different 
people have had for taking in empty names. V/hat are the intuitions we 
ought to want to capture by an account of empty reference? The most 
fundamental issue seems to be this: How can sentences with empty names
be true, when there is nothing in the world for them to be true about? 
There are various answers that form the basis of different strategies: 
such sentences are true because they are really about some other entities 
than actual objects, or they are neither true nor false. Trying to see 
under what circumstances sentences with empty names could be true means 
searching for a theory of truth for a language containing empty names. 
This is why all the extant theories we have examined were formulated 
(or reformulated here) within the framework of formal semantics. In 
the standard formal semantics no allowances for empty names are made.
One would expect there to be at least as many different ways of revising 
the formal semantics as there are different motivations behind each 
strategy. But in practice there are even more, and this makes one 
suspicious.
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There are two alternatives concerning the phenomena of empty 
reference: either admit empty names straightforwardly or alternatively
somehow exclude them from normal occurrence in contexts which are given 
a normal semantical description. V/e have explored at length the first 
alternative to see whether the phenomena of empty reference could he 
given a coherent account within any extension of the standard semantics. 
We shall come to the second alternative in the last chapter.
Once we have admitted empty names v/e have two choices: treat
them as not really empty or treat them as empty. We have seen that the 
reductionist approaches were unsatisfactory. As the result of reducing 
empty names to non-empty names, by assigning arbitrary references, /\ or 
* or ... *^, Frege, Scott and Grandy were led to some implausible 
consequences. In Scott's account identity statements involving empty 
names were not evaluated in any natural manner; and in Grandy's the 
effects of assigning * ... * to empty names were not fully
acknowledged* The worst problem is one which affects all reductive 
account of empty singular terms. In order to have a stipulation 
assigning reference to empty terms we first have to admit that there 
are terms which lack reference. Then we stipulate that these terms 
have A or * or ... as their reference. Empty terms are treated 
as simultaneously empty and non-empty.
The natural move in attempting to eliminate the defects of the 
reductionist strategy is to require that empty names be treated as 
empty (Requirement I). If we treat them as such, then there are three 
different ways of evaluating sentences containing them. First, " ^ e", 
where "e" is an empty name, can be true, second it can be false, or 
third it can be neither true nor false.
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In fact there is already another obvious requirement lurking
here* It seems that if there is to be any point at all in what we have
been attempting, then some extensional sentences with empty names should 
be treated as true and some as false (Requirement II). (Sentences such 
as "Vulcan does not exist", "Leverrier did not discover Vulcan" are 
clearly true. And sentences such as "Vulcan exists", "Leverier discovered 
Vulcan" are clearly false.)
The difficulty, however, is to make room for any of the possibilities 
true, false, truth-valueless. The outlook is not very promising to make 
’/(e)' true. If we have the standard way of interpreting names, then as 
Burge says "/(e)" cannot be evaluated as true. But if we modify the 
standard way of interpretation, for instance in the way Lambert and van 
Fraassen or Meyer and Lambert suggest, then we are in effect treating 
empty names as empty and non-empty simultaneously. Furthermore, what 
Lambert and van Fraassen describe as true in the story or Meyer and 
Lambert label as "nominal truth", is only truth to the words and not 
truth to the facts. It .is only pseudo truth. The requirement we need 
to add to our set then is that a theory of truth for a langua.ge with 
empty names explain the notion of truth that is pretheoretically given 
and nob introduce a novel notion of truth (Requirement III)*
In the second case where " ^ e" is required to be evaluated as
false, the rationale is that since "e" cannot be evaluated, to predicate 
" ^ " of "e" cannot be evaluated as true. The presupposition is that 
since there is no object the predication must be false. Only Burge’s 
theory gives us a natural or orderly way to such an evaluation. His 
theory reminds us to include amongst our requirement Tarski’s criterion 
of material adequacy for a definition of truth; or some plausible 
alternative (Requirement IV).
116
In the third case, where " pe" is regarded as truth valueless, 
the justification is that since "e" cannot be interpreted, " <p e" cannot 
be evaluated. Then we have a bifurcation which arises out of Dummett’s 
discussion of the conflict between the equivalence T*’p’’ = p and the 
admission of truth value gaps.
First, if we reject the equivalence as in van Fraassen’s method 
of supervaluation we lose the law of excluded middle and end up with 
two notions of truth, one for the object language and another for the 
metalanguage.
Second, if we follow a Kripkean theory of truth and retain the 
equivalence, the incompatability may be resolved by saying that when 
P lacks a truth value T '"p'^ lacks a truth value. In order to preserve 
T^p^ = p and evaluate P as truth valueless, we then need to appeal to 
the principle that the truth value of a compound is a function of the 
truth values of the components. When a component term lacks reference, 
we say that the sentence is truth valueless. It is capricious and 
unreasonable on the Kripkean approach not to apply this requirement to 
the whole of our language. But we have seen that a theory with truth 
value gaps has in the truth definition a clause regarding the evaluation 
of sentences with empty names which itself contains an empty term.
Then the truth theory itself has a sentence which is neither true nor 
false. But a truth theory cannot afford to have a truth valuaeless 
sentence as one of its axioms* The truth theory has to be true. This 
highlights the requirement that the semantical description of any 
linguistic device should be applicable to all its occurrences including 
its occurrences, if any, with the language of semantical description 
(Requirement V).
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There is one more requirement which it scarcely seems necessary
to add - namely that the law of non-contradiction should not be violated.
(Requirement VI)• Because of their affinity with the contemporary views
of free logic, Meinong's views might seem to be worth reconsidering.
According to Meinong there is a widespread "prejudice in favour of the
actual" among philosophers causing them to overlook the fact that "the
totality of what exists ... is infinitely smaller in comparison with the
objects of k n o w l e d g e . I n  Lambert and van Fraassen’s terms Meinong’s
statement can be explained quite simply; a singular terra t, "the golden
mountain", for example, need not refer to an actual object in order to
( 139)
occur in a true statement. Similarly, being-thus-and-so (Sosein)
Meinong said is independent of being (Sein), Meinong did however defend 
one logical principle. This was the view that in general we must accept 
"The thing which is F, is F", But as Russell pointed out we can derive 
self-contradictory sentences even from accepting such an innocuous
( i4o )
principle. An example of this is: "The thing which is round and
not round is round.and also not round." Meinong held that non-existent 
entities need not be constricted by the law of non-contradiction; but 
if this does not count as a difficulty in the realm of Sosein, what 
would?
How do we account for the fact that all the theories we have 
examined fail to meet the various plain requirements? The fact that no 
theory has obviously met all the requirements, and only one has the 
slightest promise, does not prove that they are inconsistent, or that 
they cannot be satisfied.
There is no outright inconsistency in the requirements. But how 
do we establish that except by producing a theory which satisfies them 
collectively? No attempt to provide such a theory has yet succeeded.
Why is that? Should we be looking for a theory of this sort at all?
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CHAPTER XV
AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
The time has arrived to look in another direction and suggest
a different sort of approach which requires no modification of the
standard semantics to accommodate empty reference. Let us start with a
reassessment of the standard semantics, 'Æiat do v/e require of a semantical
theory? We have followed Davidson’s view that to give the theory of
meaning for a language is to give the theory of truth. So we require
a semantical theory to provide an effective method for stating the truth
conditions for every sentence of the language which has a meaning,. The
only aspect of the language we are concerned with here is the truth-
saying aspect - the aspect in which sentences are presented to one
as true. Now fictional statements (class IV of our Chapter IV above),
if these may be disposed of first, are not - when we think of them from
outside the context of the story itself - even put forward as conditions
(l4l)
for truth. It is an absurd misunderstanding, when we look at stories
from outside the story-telling context, to think of the sentences in 
stories as having truth values. From outside that context we may be 
interested in whether someone gets the story right or not. His account 
of the plot, if he mentions the story, but doesn’t tell the story, must 
be true to the story. But ’’truth to the story” is not truth. The 
requirement we make is not very different from the requirement that the 
man who repeats the plot to us should give us correct statements of the 
form ’’The story tells that And there is less problem about these
contexts, because the vacuous names are then in an opaque position.
(We shall come to this sort of occurrence later on in the chapter),
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What then about the sentences of stories taken within the 
story-telling context? Taken there why should nob these sentences 
have meaning in just the same way in which an ordinary statement has 
meaning? Surely, while we are within the context of the story, these 
statements imitate or simulate ordinary historical statements. It 
must be wrong to give them a different account. If we want semantics, 
then we should give them the ordinary sort of semantics, and then add 
outside the semantic theory that all this is fiction, and that outside 
the relevant fiction there is no identifiable particular horse whose 
name could have its sense fixed by the stipulation:
s*(Pegasus) = Pegasus.
It is a consequence of this that the semantics themselves for 
fictional statement must be offered in the same sort of spirit as the 
fictional narrative itself. It is as if the sentences of narrative 
had normal semantics - which is quite different from the narrative 
actually having peculiar semantics.
This is a disappointment perhaps after the logicians’ cleverness 
But, strangely enough, Frege seems to have thought something similar 
to what I have just claimed. Frege writes:
Es muss von jedem Gegenstand bestimmt sein, ob 
er unter den Begriff falle oder nicht; ein 
Begriffswort, welches dieser Anforderung an 
seine Bedeutung nicht genügt, ist bedeutungslos. 
Dahin gehbrt auch z.B, das Wort (Homers
Od.X,305)î obwohl ja einige Merkmale angegeben 
sind. Darum braucht jene Stelle noch nicht sinlos 
zu sein, ebensowenig wie andere, in denen der Name 
jjNausikaa” vorkommt, der warscheinlich nichts 
bedeutet oder benennt. Aber er tut so, als benenne 
er ein MMdchen, und damit sichert er sich einenSinn. 
Und der Dichtung genügt der Sinn, der Gedanke, auch 
ohne Bedeutung, ohne Wahrheitswert, aber nicht 
der Wissenschaft.(1
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What this amounts to is that in Homer's Odyssey, it is as if
the Greek word "moly" has and extension. And the name "Nausicaa"
oehaves as if it named a girl. In this, Frege seems to say, lies its
sense. It is enough that it be as if "Nausicaa" has a reference for
it to have a sense or the sense in the story. This is close to the
formal semantical approach we have pursued in Chapter V however different
that was from the theory usually ascribed to Frege. And it is also in
agreement with what I have just claimed about fiction. To say that
a whole story is fiction, however, and that a whole set of sentences has
only been offerred as if possessed of truth conditions also involves
saying that Pegasus does not exist, there is no concealed oratio obliqua
here and we are outside the story. So I have not explained that sentence
yeto We are forced to take seriously existential statements with empty
(lA4) /
names. But perhaps Kripke’s account ("Pegasus does not exist =
there is no true proposition possible.to the effect that Pegasus exists.") 
or some other theory will suffice. Existential statements are universally 
regarded as a problem. I am not directly concerned \vdth them because they 
are a problem of their own. But this is not saying anything which makes 
the problem insoluble. (It is a problem which everybody drawn to Kripke’s 
sort of answer has that there is difficulty in saying exactly to what 
effect there is no true proposition. We have to half-embrace the story 
to say what particular true proposition is not exemplified, because once 
outside the story we can’t identify Pegasus - though we can describe 
the story from outside.)
This leads on to occurrences of empty names within oratio obliqua 
- e.g. reports of the false beliefs of others. Just as with stories we 
have to embrace the world of the story, so perhaps, in interpreting 
mistaken persons faithfully to what they mean we have to some extent to 
impersonate them.
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Davidson analyzes
Galileo said the earth moves
as
Galileo said something of which I hereby make 
myself a same-sayer:
The earth moves.
The second sentence "The earth moves" is mentioned because it is referred 
to by the first sentence (in the "hereby" pointing forwards), and it 
is also used. One may say, without falsifying Davidson, that in the 
second sentence the man reporting Galileo imitates or impersonates 
Galileo, The same holds for direct quotation. The whole theory 
assimilates indirect speech to direct speech. And it fits very well 
with what I have found myself needing for different reasons from Davidson 
to say about vacuous names in reported speech. Perhaps there is an echo 
here of something people say about the impossibility of a scientifically 
objective anthropology - that all understanding and interpretation 
involves a measure of identification or einfühlung.^ "' .^ '^'
This brings us now to the most troublesome class of sentences 
containing empty names, e.g. "Leverrier discovered Vulcan" and "Leverrier 
did nob discover Vulcan". Surely they are not meaningless, even though 
we cannot say which thing Vulcan is, or even say which thing Vulcan 
would have been - though we can imagine roughly what it would have been 
like if things had permitted us to say which thing Vulcan was - especially 
if we are prepared to "put ourselves in Leverrier’s shoes". (But with 
a straightforward non-fictional non-opaque context we have got 
everything we can out of this identification possibility.)
The trouble is that we want to say that "Leverrier discovered 
Vulcan" is false and that "Leverrier did not discover Vulcan" is true.
122
That was the virtue of Burge's theory. We did not say that that theory 
was wrong, we only questioned its c cm pi 515. t i I i t y . Pending its actual 
completion perhaps it is possible to ask whether Burge has achieved 
by the theory as it stands very much more than we could achieve by 
saying (1) that "Leverrier discovered Vulcan" is not true, with an 
explanation, in terras of Leverrier's beliefs, why it is interesting 
that it is not true even though, as things are, the sentence has missed 
having truth grounds and (2) that "Leverrier did not discover Vulcan" 
means the same as "it is not true that Leverrier discovered Vulcan", 
which means the same as " 'Leverrier discovered Vulcan' is not true" - 
which could be offerred with the same explanation as (1). This is not 
to say that "Vulcan" is not a name in these sentences. "Vulcan" is 
a sign cut out for the role of naming things. But actually it has 
failed to name anything. So any transparent sentence with "Vulcan" 
in it will lack definite truth grounds lunless it can be reinterpreted 
a little.
(2) offers a metalinguistic reading of the problem sentence.
But someone v/ill complain that we feel that "not" does not really mean 
the same as "it is not true that". I think that one reason for that 
feeling is the availability of a non-metalinguistic sentence which, if 
we know anything about Leverrier, we can frame "It is not the case that. 
Leverrier discovered the planet which disturbs the perihelion of Mercury". 
The definite description here will have what Russell called secondary 
occurrence. I stress that we are not falling back here into the description 
theory, because we are not offering this sentence as équivalent to 
"Leverrier did not discover Vulcan". I am saying that, because this 
descriptive sentence is one we naturally think of, and can easily frame, 
we get the illusion that "Leverrier did not discover Vulcan" is a non- 
metalinguistic truth.
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I make these proposals in the belief that the only true sentences there are 
which contain empty proper names in extensional position are negative ones.
Any adherent of Burge's system will share this belief for atomic predications- 
But, he will ask, what about complex predications? Does my theory disregard 
all complexity and simply make the general stipulation U?
Consider the complex sentence
"If Leverrier discovered Vulcan then Leverrier discovered Vulcan"
We evaluate this as U because of the presence of "Vulcan". Burge will break 
it down and give it the evaluation 
F =3 F.
That means it will be true for Burge. So there do exist, for Burge, true 
statements with empty names in extensional position, provided the predication 
is non-atomic- For us on the other hand, by the ruling so far suggested, the 
whole sentence is not-true (and not false either), because of the vacuity of 
"Vulcan".
It is a fair complaint that even if atomic sentences with empty names are 
strictly truth-groundless-this does not justify a "blanket" stipulation U for 
all compound sentences involving such components- So instead of treating 
sentences with empty names within them in extensional position as automatically 
not true, we could propose the rule that a sentence with empty names be broken 
down into the shortest constitutent clauses or components capable of being 
evaluated. But I still believe II is in fact, the right evaluation for
"If Leverrier discovered Vulcan then Leverrier discovered Vulcan", 
and I can say this not in virtue of a blanket stipulation but in virtue of the 
fact that it is evaluated
(not-true) => (not-true) 
or, using Kleene's notation (cp- Ch. IX),
U => U.
If v/e use either the weak or the strong tables of Kleene this is U ,
though it is worth noting that an 'irregular* table (Lukasiewicz, see Kleene 
op- cit. p- 335) gives
r
emptv
On my approach, which makes atomic sentences U because truth-groundless, we still 
have to make a decision between all these tables- The reason why I should 
defend the ruling U for the particular sentence recently quoted is that the 
ruling T has the effect of putting into the actual (as opposed to the als ob 
language, or the language we must use to impersonate others) a true sentence 
with a term which has no actual meaning- (The term has no actual meaning, even
though we may have to proceed as if it had a meaning when we tell stories or
give the content of the beliefs of deluded people- But that is not what we are 
concerned about here-) We may bring out the difference between the weak and 
the strong tables and the nature of the decision which someone following my 
general approach would have to make if we look at another example. Consider 
"If Leverrier discovered Vulcan then Leverrier was an astronomer", 
i.e. the case of U =j T, which is evaluated by strong tables as T and by weak 
tables as TJ. Surely, it may be objected, this should be true- I could accommo­
date that decision on my approach, by adopting the strong tables- But if it is
true - I'm not sure that it is - then it is true, not because of the meaningful­
ness of the antecedent of the conditional, but for the same reasons as 
"If the mome rath outgrabe then Leverrier was an astronomer" 
is true - if it is true —  ^which is also to be evaluated 
U =  T.
To assign T to this would be to say that a sentence in the form "......=> T  *' jj-
relatively insensitive to what meaningless stuff is inserted into the sntecedent- 
That is just what it would come to for me to choose thes^fcrong tables- I should 
not be saying that the sentence "If Leverrier discovered Vulcan then Leverrier 
was an
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astronomer" was true because we can truly predicate of Vulcan the property 
(\x)(Leverrier discovered x => Leverrier was an astronomer).
For on my theory "Vulcan" is not a semantically determinate name which we could 
use for such a purpose. It has not actually been given the sense which it 
would have had if Leverrier had discovered some planet he searched for when he 
wanted to explain the disturbance of the perihelion of Mercury.
The case of U => T shows then that my general approach leaves something to 
be decided about compounds where one component has in its airgument place an 
empty name. The decision to call the compound U corresponds to a preference 
for Kleene's weak tables, which never assign anything but U to a wff with a U 
component. As the concluding remarks about convention T will make clear, the 
doctrines of this chapter put us in a better position than the abandoned theory 
of Chapter XII did to adopt the weak tables if they seem to be the best way of 
accommodating clauses without determinate truth grounds. We are free to choose 
the most "natural".
Truth functional compounds are not the only place where we have to make a
decision. What about
"If Leverrier has discovered Vulcan he would have been a more famous 
astronomer"?
Certainly that seems to say something worth saying. It seems to be true but it
is dubious that any evaluation procedure available to me could make it (non-
vacuously) true - obscure though counterfactuals are. But I think the sentence
says whatever it says via an obvious reinterpretation which is available, namely:
"If Leverrier had discovered a planet answering to the specifications 
he gave for the name 'Vulcan', then he would have been a more famous 
astronomer".
This latter sentence makes straightforward sense and I believe it gives the 
whole content of the first sentence which purports to mention Vulcan itself.
That is what we take the first sentence, which ray theory would have to call 
strictly truth-groundless, to mean. The reinterpretation, which has truth-grounds, 
pr&ps up the truth-groundless sentence like a crutch.
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The mention here of the Kleene three-valued tables could cause confusion. 
There are two different approaches to empty reference which argue for extensional 
sentences with empty names' being truth-valueless, and therefore two different 
uses to which Kleene's tables could be put. One approach, see Chapter XII, sees 
the truth-valuelessness as perfectly all right^neither as a symptom of meaning­
lessness nor as undermining the meaningfulness of empty names. The other approach 
the present chapter, sees the truth-valuelessness of sentences and clauses 
containing empty names as caused by their lack of determinate sense and it 
uses informal methods in the first instance to characterize sympathetically 
what is going on when strictly truth-groundless sentences are uttered. This 
second approach only resorts to such things as the Kleene tables to codify these 
informal insights. My position is not the first but the second of these. Let 
q be a sentence with an empty name n in it. The first approach says q is in
the semantically determinate part of the language. It may assign the truth
Chapter x n ,  •
value Ü because of the emptiness of n. Convention T forces upon thg/^theorist5
for reasons mentioned in Chapter Xl^the strong Kleene table.
The second approach, which I have adopted, says q is not in the semantically
determinate part of the language. It assigns U because q is not semantically
comulex
determinate. The second approach then has to decide how tolerant^sentences of 
the language are to be of semantically indeterminate components. The choice of 
weak tables is the decision that they are intolerant. The strong tables are 
more tolerant. But there are in fact a large number of different three-valued 
logics to choose between. .
The second approach enjoys this freedom because it does not face one 
problem the first faces. Consider the putative T-sentence
**True 'Leverrier discovered Vulcan = Leverrier discovered Vulcan^
The right hand side on my interpretation is evaluated not true (/ false). But 
the left hand side predicates truth of that very sentence, and is therefore on
cmy view false. Therefore I cannot put forward this T-sentence as a truth. It
is F = U which is U (on either weak or strong tables). A Kripkean theory which
wanted "Leverrier discovered Vulcan" inside the semantically determinate part
of the language has to arrange matters for the left hand side to be U. So we
have U = U. It will then have to arrange matters for this to count as T.
Provided that we have U = U this is feasible. (Though the strong tables will 
tio €h^ j o b  by
notyt^  . themselves , There is here a loose end in Kripke's theory of the
liar paradox. See my reservations on p. 99» The point is that paradoxical 
sentences are not denied T-equivalences. See p. 88. An adaptation of 
Lukasiewicz tables might be needed.)
On my theory all this is both unnecessary and undesirable. It is undesir­
able because we want "It is not true that Leverrier discovered Vulcan" to be 
evaluated as true (see point (2) of p. 122). We saw that only in that way can 
we do justice by our metalinguistic reinterpretation to the apparent truth of 
"Leverrier did not discover Vulcan". It would wreck our theory to evaluate 
"True 'Leverrier discovered Vulcan'" as U. It is also unnecessary - because 
we escape the difficulty about the T sentence by denying that "Leverrier 
discovered Vulcan" is in the semantically determinate part of object language ojr 
metalanguage. Given this denial we are under no obligation to put forward or 
subscribe to any T-equivalence for it. That would involve us in using in a 
serious way, in order to assert a truth, a sentence which was not semantically 
determinate.
We can summarize the final position we arrived at in the thesis as follows. 
For intensional predicates with apparent direct objects, we have adopted Quine's 
strategy to eliminate the direct object and paraphrase then in terms of preposit­
ional attitudes and prepositional objects. For sentences with empty terms in 
opaque contexts, e.g. indirect speech and fiction, we adopt Frege's account of 
"als ob" and Davidson's solution for indirect discourse. That is half the 
problem. But there are empty names in extensional contexts which these two 
strategies leave unresolved; existential statements and sentences with empty
f2.$ D
names and extensional predicates. Existential statements such as "Vulcan exists" 
are a universal problem needing to be accommodated regardless of any other 
issues concerning empty phenomena. We leave the problem aside. For sentences 
such as "Leverrier discovered Vulcan" and their negation, we give a metalinguistic 
treatment. The truth "Leverrier did not discover Vulcan" is reinterpreted, as 
the assertion that "Leverrier discovered Vulcan" is not true and it is evaluated 
as true. "Leverrier discovered Vulcan" is neither^nor false. Therefore it is 
not true. "Mot true" is not equivalent to "false", but all that was needed was 
that "Leverrier discovered Vulcan" should not be true.
The metalanguage we use is two-valued. The semantically determinate object 
language is also two-valued. We put the sentences without a determinate truth 
value outside the part of the language for which the truth theory is given.
9W/\  AyoTÊ- 
(l46 a ). Kleene's strong tables for
Q
p T F Tî
T T F U
F T T T
U T U U
Kleene's weak tables for
Q
P T F U
T T F ü
F T T ü
U U ü ü
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APPENDIX I
SMILEY'S "SENSE WITHOUT DENOTATION ,,(147)
Smiley has proposed a theory in which empty singular terms 
and general terms and truth value gaps are admitted. The distinguishing 
characteristic of Smiley's theory regarding empty terms is that, unlike 
the theories of Frege, Scott and Grandy, it is not a reductive account 
which assigns arbitrary extension to empty terms. Empty singular terms 
are not assigned a special denotation and assimilated to non-empty terms. 
Smiley states his aim as follows.
My purpose here is to outline a theory of 
formal logic in which the features that cause 
the difficulty - incompletely defined properties 
and functions, bearer-less names, unrestricted 
formation of definite descriptions - can be 
explicitly accommodated. This is done by 
adopting the standard definitions of logical 
truth and logical consequence to take in the 
possibility of terms without denotation and 
sentences without truth-values.(l^8)
The aim in giving such an account corresponds to ours:
The whole point of the logic here proposed is 
to allow different and even incompatible theories 
to be formulated simultaneously in one an.d the 
same language. In particular we can all draw on 
a common vocabulary of names without being 
committed to some all-inclusive ontology.^^4?)
There is another point on which Smiley's view is attractive. 
Smiley remarks that the standard rules for the assignment of values 
to formulas do not assign values to formulas containing empty terms. 
But it seems that "for some relevant sentences, there is in principle 
no problem at all about attributing truth or falsity (and indeed in 
some cases one particular attribution is i n e s c a p a b l e ) " . S o m e
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cases considered by Smiley that are particularly relevant to our problem 
are: "Pegasus does not exist" and "It is not true that the king of France 
is bald", Such sentences do seem to deserve a definite truth value.
We also have sentences with empty names that seem to lack a determinate 
truth value. Examples are: "Vulcain is a planet", "Vulcan disturbs the
perihelion of Mercury". Smiley would regard them as truth values.
Smiley observes that there are two orthodox approaches, Russell's and 
Frege's, to the problem of evaluating sentences with empty names but 
does not elaborate on their shortcomings. We might say that Russell's 
account which excludes all constants from the vocabulary would not be 
suitable for any system which is intended to be applied to natural 
languages. As for Frege's account which has a rule stipulating that 
every term shall have a denotation and every sentence shall have a truth 
value, we have said that it is arbitrary. The assignment of truth value 
to sentences cannot be a result of stipulation.
Smiley follows the standard procedure of formulating the semantics
for a language by using the notion of interpretation. In Smiley's
formulation, a particular interpretation involves the choice of some
non-empty domain of individuals and assignment of values to terms and 
(131)
sentences. The rules for assigning values to terms and sentences
are the standard ones. But in effect, we are given a semantics with 
truth value gaps. In the actual rules, there are no special clauses 
for empty terms or sentences ontaining them, and only two truth values 
T and F are assigned to sentences. But Smiley interprets his rule 3 
(given below), which assigns values to sentences, in such a way that, 
without explicitly stating the presence of truth value gaps, the failure 
of the. rule to apply in some cases leads to admitting truth value gaps. 
The rule is:
128
3* If the values assigned to the predicate F and
the terms ... are the function F and the 
individuals a^ ... a^ respectively, then the value 
of the sentence ... Fa^ shall he F(a^ ... a^)
C1 c-
which is a truth value.
The clauses for the usual connectives and quantifiers are also 
stated without a special provision of truth value gaps. But again as 
the result of these .rules failing to assign truth values to some 
sentences, truth value gaps are present in the system Smiley outlines.
The usual connectives are called "primary connectives" by Smiley, to be 
distinguished from "secondary connectives" which Smiley introduces to 
accommodate cases for which primary connectives are not adequate,
Smiley points out that admitting truth value gaps does not solve all 
the problems about sentences with empty terms. There are sentences 
with empty terms to which one particular attribution is inescapable. 
Examples of these are: "Pegasus does not exist", "It is not true that
the king of France is bald". Smiley’s proposal is to bring the sentences 
containing empty terras that lack a truth value and that have a truth 
value under one formal system by introducing into the metalanguage 
an additional singularly connective "t". "t" may be rendered "it is
true that" and is governed by the following rule:
Rule: The value of the sentence t A shall be T if the
value of the sentence A is T; otherwise it shall 
be
Smiley emphasizes that unlike the rules given for the usual connectives 
this is not a verbal rendering of any two-valued truth table: the
"otherwise" clause provides for the case where no entry under A can
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be made on a table© The value of t A shall be F not only when the value 
of A is F but also when A has no truth value. This shows that T^pl = p 
is rejected, for when P lacks a truth value, T^pl does not lack a truth 
value but has the value F„ V/e shall return to this issue.
follows
The connective ’t' is used to define "secondary connectives" as 
(154)
A = df tA
A V B - = df tA V tB
A 5^ B = df tA & t3
A ^ B df t A o tB
A = B — - df t A = tB
An occurrence of a term a in a sentence A is "primary" if it 
does not lie within the scope of any occurrence of the connective "t"; 
otherwise a’s occurrence is "secondary". This distinction enables us 
to mark out a boundary line, among sentences containing empty names, 
between those that will fail to have a truth value and those that will 
have one nevertheless: if the.term has a primary occurrence in A, and
a is assigned no value, then A has no truth-value. Unless "we are 
willing to assert that a particular name has a bearer we cannot use 
that name as a name (i.e in a primary o c c u r r e n c e ) . T h e  con­
sequence of this would be that "Vulcan is a planet", "Vulcan = Vulcan" 
and all other sentences with empty names and without the truth operator 
are truth-valueless. And the sentences that contain the truth
operator as the main operator are always assigned a truth value. The 
sentences whose only connectives are secondary never lack a truth value: 
the secondary connectives (even when sentences without truth values are 
admitted) behave exactly as do the connectives in the,orthodox treatment
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With regard to the secondary connectives truth value gaps are not 
admitted.
Here v/e may want to ask how does ^miley know that there is a 
function t with this remarkable property?
Now we can compare the primary connectives and secondary 
connectives. We have seen that in regard to the primary connectives 
truth value gaps are admitted and in regard to the secondary connectives 
truth value gaps and Trpi = p are not admitted. This justifies our 
classification of Smiley's theory as a hybrid between the account that 
rejects both truth value gaps and the schema T^pi = p and the account 
that rejects T^ p"' z p and retains truth value gaps.
The most important contrast between primary an.d secondary 
connectives is
the contrast between the primary negation sign 
' '  (which might be rendered by a simple 'not' 
as in "the king of France is not bald"), and the 
secondary negation-sign (which should be
rendered 'ik is not true that as in "it is not
true that the king of France is bald.")- A and A 
are contraries, in that they cannot simultaneously 
take value T; on the other hand A and/-^ A are 
contradictories, for always one and only one of 
them has value T.(^3o)
Smiley has given two kinds of negations: the primary negation 
might perhaps be seen as predicate negation and the secondary negation 
as sentence negation. The value of such a distinction would be that we 
can distinguish, for instance, "Vulcan is not a planet" from "It is not 
true that Vulcan is a planet". With Frege we might say that v/e cannot 
affirm or deny that a predicate applies to a term when the term lacks 
reference. So "Vulcan is not a planet" does not have a truth value.
And to say that is to admit, that "It is not true that Vulcan is a
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planet" is true. Smiley applies the epithets "internal" and "external" 
to negation expressed by " ^ "  and '1-^", and explains their function as . 
follows.
... someone who uses the first to deny a 
proposition belonging to some theory, myth, 
etc., is committed to the theory's ontology 
to just the same extent as if he upheld the 
original proposition - he as it were makes 
his denial within the theory. In contrast 
someone who wishes not so much to contradict a 
particular assertion as to reject the ontology 
behind it must use the second mode of negation.
There are attractive things here - especially in the remark last 
quoted - insights which almost any sensible theory would want to secure 
for itself. I hope some of these are accessible to my own informal 
account. But there are objections to Smiley's theory taken as a whole.
It seems evident that Smiley has not given one system of logic but two 
distinct systems: one for primary connectives and another for secondary
connectives. It would seem that to apply his view, we must find a lot 
of ambiguity - how do we resolve the ambiguities he requires? Ve shall 
attempt to show why these two connectives with radically different 
semantics cannot be given a uniform interpretation in one system of logic.
First, in regard to the primary connectives, as we have seen
above, the logic is three-valued. As Smiley points out, the law of
excluded middle A v ~/A is not v a l ^ e ' d . ^ W i t h  respect ,to the
secondary connectives, we have two-valued logic: t A v t A is valid
and truth value gaps are not admitted. This incongruence between the
two kinds of connectives cannot be smoothed over. Smiley remarks that
his theory can be reconciled with the standard two-valued interpretation
(159)by assimilating "neither T nor F" as F, But this would not make
the three-valued logic into a two-valued one; the essential characteristic 
of the primary connectives is that they are given an interpretation which
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has truth value gaps. This fact does not change by our labeling truth 
value gaps as F or T.
Second, for the primary connectives free logic is not adopted 
but for the secondary connectives, it is. (As remarked this makes one 
wonder hov/ we interpret any actual connective.) Smiley states that in 
his theory the existential generalization A(a) h (3x) A(x) goes through 
only with (3x)(x=a), added as a further p r e m i s e . T h i s  is what 
many empty name theorists have wanted. Eut Smiley's claim is not 
completely accurate, for when A(a) has only primary connectives, we do 
have'k(a) a exists”according to Smiley's treatment of primary 
occurrences of t e r m s , a n d  then A(a)h (5 x) A(x) is forthcoming
without a further premise. So for primary connectives free logic is not
adopted and the "advantage" disappears. It only remains for secondary 
connective contexts.
The secondary connectives in Smiley's system are primary 
connectives with "t" added on to them, then. A natural thing to say 
then is that the secondary connectives belong to a metalanguage, and 
the primary connectives to an object language; and there is a mismatch 
of the kind we have often pointed to between the object language and the 
metalanguage. If Smiley's system is to be applied to a natural language, 
say English, which is both our object language and our metalanguage, this
mismatch is a serious defect. What Smiley has tried to bring about by
the injection of "t" we have suggested should be brought about by less 
formal means.
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APPENDIX II
TRUTH VALUE GAPS
In set theory and proposition theory there are deep reasons for 
admitting truth value gaps and predicates with partial interpretation.
One of the most natural ways of treating the set theoretical paradoxes 
and semantical paradoxes seems to be to regard them as lacking a definite 
truth value. The traditional approach to the paradoxes of set theory 
and.the paradoxes of theory of propositions has been to say that they 
are essentially different and require separate solutions. It is far 
beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the question whether there 
can be a universal theory that provides a solution to both kinds of 
paradoxes within a single theory. C. Parsons has pointed out the 
similarity between Russell's paradox and the paradox of the liar and 
argued that semantical paradoxes should be treated in a way that stresses 
their analogies with set theoretical p a r a d o x e s . J . F .  Thomson has 
made similar c l a i m s . T h e  purpose of this Appendix is to supplement 
the account given in our Chapter XI on Kripke by bringing forward certain 
set theoretical arguments for truth value gaps. I have found such 
theories for proper names unsatisfactory; but it seems important to 
face the very strong general arguments there are for truth value gaps.
There are two ways a subject - predicate sentence "Pa" might 
fail to have a truth v a l u e . ( 1 )  The predicate "P" is true or false 
of each object there is but "Pa" has not truth value because 'a' has no 
denotation. (2) The singular term "a" denotes a (unique) object 06 
but t>L is an object of which the predicate "P" is neither true nor false. 
It can be argued from the philosophy of set theory that such situations 
are inevitable. The following argument suggests that (2) is inevitable 
and directly leads to (1).
134
(a) Experience shows that Zermelo - Fraenkel (ZF) or von Neumann - 
Bernays - Güdel (NBG) set theory is the proper response to 
the paradoxes of naive set theory.
(b) It is of the essence of ZF & NBG (and simple type theory) that 
there is no set of all sets and hence there is no set of 
absolutely everything.
(c) Let L be a language© To interpret L we need a (usually non­
empty, but that does not matter) domain D and a function I 
which assigns each constant of L a member of D (or at most 
one member of D if we allow partial I), and each n-adic 
predicate letter of L, a set or order n-tuples of members
of D (or a disjoint pair of subsets of D^, the set of all 
ordered n-tuples of members of D, as extension and anti­
extension in D). The crucial point here is that in order 
to be sure that all subsets of exist to provide extensions 
of an n-adic predicate letter of L, D must be a set. By (b), 
not everything can be a member of D.
(d) It follows that for any language L and any interpretation I 
of L in any domain D and any (monadic) predicate ’P' of L, 
there must be an object not in D and hence not in the domain 
of things of which I says P is true or false. This then is 
a case in which we have an oC which is the denotation of no 
singular term a of L under I and of which no monadic predicate 
of L is either true or false under I.
(e) One could view (d) as saying that a situation occupying "the" 
middle ground between (1) and (2) is inevitable. But the best 
way to read (d) seems to be that it is impossible to interpret'
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any language L so that any (monadic) predicate is either 
true or false of absolutely eveiything, even if for any 
object any language L, and any constant a of L, there 
is an interpretation I of L in which a denotes oL ; this 
says that type (2) situations must be the norm. The point 
can be put this way: either no set has a complement (à la
ZF) or the complement of a set is not a set (à la NBG).
For model theory (or generalized truth theory), both the 
extension and anti-extension must exist and be sets. So 
in either case, no predicate can be interpreted (i.e. 
handled in generalized truth the or;/) so as to be either 
true or false of absolutely everything i.e., the anti­
extension of F is not the complement of ^  x | Fx^, assuming 
F has an extension.
(f) Such type-(2) situations make type-(l) situations inevitable. 
Suppose that each (monadic) predicate of L must have a 
negation (in L); then for any interpretation I of L, one
of them has no extension. Suppose that for each 1-place 
open sentence Sx of L, the terra "^xjSxj" (= "the set of all 
X such that Sx") must be an expression of L. Then it 
follows that for each interpretation I of L, there is a 
singular terra*of L which has no denotation under I.
(g) To establish that (2) situations force (1) situations, let 
. "a" be a vacuous singular terra. In a (2)-situation there
is a predicate such that "Pa" has no truth value. If we 
can form the predicate "is a truth value of 'Pa' ", 
subject to reasonable assumptions neither nor ff ) can 
be included in either its extension or antiextension, so
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it has only a partial interpretation - which is a (1) 
situation.
(h) In a way the thrust of the argument (a) - (g) is that 
ultimately the distinction between (1) and (2) must 
break down. That is, we have to expect predicates for 
which there are objects (in fact, most objects) of which 
the predicate is neither true nor false (as it were, 
"satisfaction" must be a partial predicate, if the 
satisfiers and satisfieds must both make up sets, which
they must) and consequently we must expect singular terras
without denotations.
(j) All this shows that type (1) and (2) situations are
inevitable. This means that the vacuous singular terms 
are inevitable and the problems of vacuous singular terms 
are not trivial at all. But this says nothing about how 
such problems must be solved, only that they must be.
The argument can be applied to proposition theory. Clearly 
in natural language we have predicates with partial interpretations -
indeed most predicates have only partial interpretations. Since we have
the definite description operator "the", we can form singular terms 
v/ithout denotation, given a partial predicate and a wrong sortal term 
for that predicate. We cannot dismiss such singular terms without 
dismissing most of the predicates in the language*
For set theory, the thesis that predicates with partial inter­
pretation forces us to admit empty singular terms holds for all singular 
terms, names and definite descriptions. In set theory, the distinction 
between names and definite descriptions does not have much value, since
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there are no proper names of the ordinary kind. But in natural languages 
the difference between the two cannot be ignored. Given the description 
operator ("the" and any predicate we can form a definite description.
Proper names cannot however be formed in this way. If I am right in 
arguing that the only tenable theory of proper names is to fix their 
sense via their reference in clauses of the form
s*(n) = b,
and that these clauses must be put forward as true, not indeterminate, 
then this is another reason (besides those normally given) for distinguishing 
very strictly between the problems of empty names and empty descriptions.
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